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There are numerous interrelationships between joint operations,
maritime theaters, operational or campaign planning, and combat. This
thesis is an analysis of the British Turkish campaign of 1915, the German
Norwegian campaign in 1940, and the U. S. Korean campaign in 1950 to
discover some of these interrelationships. For each campaign, the nation's
joint service organization and strategic rationale is discussed in order to show
its influence on operational planning. The plan for each of the campaigns is
then presented, and compared to the actual combat which occurred during
the execution of the plan. The analysis emphasizes two important purposes
of the operation plan. First, the operational plan organizes means, space, and
time in order to coordinate the actions of the (joint) forces available. Second,
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I. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The subject of joint operations in a maritime theater requires an
operational perspective of military activity, rather than the strategic-technical
approach often taken by contemporary analysts. The strategic-technical
approach attempts to directly relate problems of war with specific types of
equipment, without considering the human factor. This approach could be
represented by the narrow debate concerning the merits of antitank guided
munitions versus tanks on the Central Front in NATO, or the merits of
nuclear propelled submarines versus surface warships on the seas. By
attempting to relate such technical matters directly to strategic considerations,
it ignores important intermediate factors, one of which is the linkage between
strategy and tactics.
The operational perspective represents one link between the broad
national considerations of the strategic level of warfare and the narrower
considerations of the tactical level of warfare. Through the lens of the
operational perspective, the influence of the interconnecting elements can be
discerned. Rather than construct a list of the characterizations of these
elements at each level of warfare, it is of greater value to recognize the
tensions at the linkage between the demands of national policy and the
violence of individual engagements. This tension which exists at the
interface of the strategic and tactical levels can be illustrated by events in the
Marianas Islands campaign in the Pacific Theater during the Second World
War.
Admiral Raymond Spruance, as commander of the Fifth Fleet, was
responsible for the conduct of that campaign. His force consisted of two
elements: the landing forces, comprised of ground and naval forces, and the
fast carrier strike force, which was to act as a covering force for the landing
force. On the second day of the amphibious operation, the main body of the
Japanese fleet appeared in the theater. Spruance had to decide whether to
seek out, with the fast carriers, the Japanese fleet to engage the Japanese in a
decisive battle, or to hold the fast carriers in the vicinity of the landing to
provide protection.
Spruance was faced with conflicting strategic objective of destroying the
Japanese fleet and of capturing the island to continue the advance closer
toward the Japanese homeland. He also had to consider the opposing tactical
benefits of gaining greater freedom of action for the U.S. fleet and his assigned
tactical mission of capturing Guam. Spruance decided to keep the carriers in
position to protect the landing.
As the campaign unfolded, the Japanese fleet launched a massive air raid
aimed at the landing force. The U.S. carriers, on the tactical defensive,
responded by intercepting the raid and preventing an attack upon the
amphibious force. However, the U.S. fast carriers were not in range to launch
an effective counterstrike against the Japanese carriers. The results of the
battle were that the Japanese lost only a few capital ships to submarine attacks
as they were withdrawing, but that aircraft from U.S. carriers obliterated the
inventory of Japanese sea-based strike aircraft and trained pilots, at little cost
to the American fleet.
From the operational perspective, Spruance acted correctly. Nevertheless,
he was severely criticized for seeking to protect the landing and for failing to
follow the Mahanian tenet of seeking a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet.
The result of his appreciation of the operational situation can be compared to
the debacle which later occurred at Leyte Gulf when Admiral Halsey left that
landing unprotected by the fast carrier task force and pursued a decoy group of
Japanese carriers that had no aircraft on board.
Mastery of the operational perspective requires a balanced assessment of
both strategic requirements and tactical possibilities, as practiced by Admiral
Spruance. This thesis analyzes the role of planning and combat by joint forces
in a maritime theater, within the context of the operational perspective.
Before expanding on the method followed, the basis of the analytical method
must be explained.
A. PLANNING AND WAR
The human ability to imagine the future and to make preparations for it
underlies the process of planning. When an individual or organization is
confronted with a situation requiring that a specific objective be attained
within a limited period of time, the process of planning results in either an
explicit or implicit plan. The disparity between the future as imagined during
the planning process, and the future as reality unfolds, produces a continued
reassessment and change in the plan until the objective is either met or
abandoned. To extend this observation into the realm of military operations
for the purposes of this study requires an understanding of the nature of war
and a specific approach to the planning process.
The primary organizations in the modern international system are
nation /states. Each state faces the problem of the eventual merging of the
future with experienced reality; the act of planning emerges as a necessary
mechanism to guide the affairs of the state. The occurrence of war is often
part of the larger context of relations between nation /states; planning is one
action taken by the state during war.
Clausewitz characterized war as a trinity of chance, politics, and violence.
(Paret, 1986, pp. 201-202) The scope of the subject of war and its relation to
politics and society is vast; one means available to guide a study of military
operations is to search for interrelationships among the elements of this
trinity. Planning for war is one aspect of the affairs of the state, and planning
also serves as one of the unifying forces of the trinity.
This study is concerned with the dynamic relationship between planning
and joint service organizations in combat in a maritime theater of operations.
Subordinate elements of this trinity of war roughly correspond to the subject.
Chance is the realm of the commander and the military, of which joint
operations are a part. Broad national policy dictated by the government must
be applied to specific geographic locations within a theater of operations. The
violence of combat created by the clash of wills on the battlefield arises from
the execution of a planned course of action. This subordinate trinity of
limited scope is also, in part, interconnected by planning.
The planning process, as outlined above, is simple. The frictions
inherent to large organizations and the danger associated with combat result
in a requirement for a complex planning process. In an effort to reduce
friction, formal planning systems are developed by military organizations.
These systems consist of a series of steps to guide the commander and his
staff, and include steps such as the estimate of the situation, development of
courses of action, development of the plan, writing of the directive, and
supervision of the planned action (Cullen, 1970, pp. 15-18). While such a
system is valuable to reduce friction and control large organizations, it cannot
succeed unless the individuals using the system exercise their creativity and
genius. It is this aspect of the planning process which needs to be considered.
This study seeks to relate the operational perspective and the
planning /execution dynamic to joint operations in a maritime theater. The
method of analysis to be followed consists of an inquiry into the primary
considerations of three categories which influence planning: joint operations,
theater of operations, and execution.
B. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The employment of military forces in support of policy requires an
appreciation of the means, or forces available; space, or the area of operations;
and time, or the phases and engagements of the campaign. In this analysis,
the category of joint operations concerns the organization of the means, the
category of a theater of operations concerns the organization of space, and the
category of execution concerns the organization of time. In each of these
categories, there is the potential for planning to be an organizing tool.
1. Joint Operations
Imprecise terminology is often used in the analysis of joint
operations. Doctrinally, joint operations mean that two or more services are
engaged in a single operation. The implication is that the decision of whether
an operation is to be joint or single-service, and the decision of which services
are to be included in that operation, are dictated by a given situation. In
practice, however, joint operations often include all services regardless of the
dictates of the situation. This later practice would be properly called unified,
rather than joint, organization of military forces. There are problems with
this term also; separate from unified organization is the concept of unified
command. Unified command is derived from the accepted practice of unity
of command. The analyst must be careful to separate considerations of the
organization of military forces from considerations of the command of
military forces.
A further distinction concerning the nature of the organization of
military forces can be made between the administrative and readiness
function and the operational function. Although both functions are related,
they have different organizational requirements. Administration and
readiness strives for efficiency, which is best accomplished through a
centralized organization. Operations seek effectiveness in combat, which is
best accomplished through a decentralized organization. A possible
implication of this functional distinction is that the administrative and
readiness function is best accomplished through unified organization, while
the operational function is best accomplished through a joint organization.
When viewed from the operational perspective, the advantages of
joint operations are derived from the advantages obtained through combined
arms operations at the tactical level. In a given situation, a joint operation
may be dictated either through the requirements of the mission or through
the scarcity of forces. To illustrate, given the different capabilities and
limitations represented by land, sea, and air forces, there must exist some
ideal combination of these forces that will best accomplish a particular
mission. On the other hand, given that the frictions of war and misallocation
of forces may result in a scarcity of forces available, a combination of the only
forces available must be utilized to accomplish the mission. These are the
extreme cases for the justification of the organization of a joint force.
Planning provides the framework to organize the combination
among the different types of military forces and to commit to combat that
joint force to accomplish the objective to be attained in a given situation. It is
clear that the organizational considerations of joint operations are dictated by
the situation, which is derived from the conditions which exist within the
theater of operations.
2. Theater of Operations
This category is a derivative of the political element at the highest
level of warfare. A nation faces economic, diplomatic, and cultural threats
and opportunities outside of its geographical borders. These threats and
opportunities give rise to national interests, which are ultimately based on
the values of the people of the nation. When the national interests of a
nation conflicts with the national interest of another, the most extreme form
of that conflict is war.
This war could be very simple, or it could be very complex. If it is
simple, the fighting is located in one location and the nation does not have to
guard against threats from third nations. This allows the nation to devote all
available resources in one direction. However, the war could be very
complex; the war could be located in more than one direction relative to the
boundaries of the nation, and additional threats from third and fourth
nations could be located in still other directions. In order for the political and
military leadership to deal with these complications, they can develop
different geographical theaters of war as a tool to allocate resources through
the ranking of interests.
This process of dividing the spatial dimension of the war can
continue down through different levels of analysis: The commander of a
theater of war can divide it into theaters of operations. Theaters of operations
can be divided into operating areas, and operating areas can eventually be
reduced into fields of fire for individual weapons.
This concept is not meant to be prescriptive, but rather descriptive in
order to understand the purpose and utility of theaters. Some general
characteristics of theaters are:
First, all theaters are indirectly interconnected. Clausewitz defined a
theater of operations as "...a sector of the total war area which has protected
boundaries and so a certain degree of independence." He continued by noting
the nature of that independence, "A sector of this kind is not just a part of the
whole but a subordinate entity in itself—depending on the extent to which
changes occurring elsewhere in the war area affect it not directly but only
indirectly." (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 280)
Second, theaters can be established either as required during a war or
prior to the beginning of the war. General Walter Warlimont, a member of
the OKW staff, believed that theaters cannot be anticipated prior to war, but
that they grow out of the natural progression of the war. (Warlimont,
"Reflections", 1979, pp. 38-39) The United States, on the other hand, has a
system of established theaters under the Unified Command Plan. The NATO
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alliance has done the same, dividing Western Europe into designated theaters
of operations for Allied Forces North, Allied Forces South, and Allied Forces
Central.
Third, a close relationship exists between a theater and geography.
Geographical features determine the both the boundaries of a theater and the
nature of the objectives and operations within a theater. A theater
encompasses the land and sea within it, and the air space above it. Depending
upon the relative position of the nation with the location of its opponents, a
theater will consist of varying amounts of land and sea.
This geographical characteristic of theaters leads to a definition of
maritime theaters as, "An area of potential wartime operations in which the
lines of communication are primarily across water and the potential
battlefields are in littoral zones within reach of naval power." (Blair, 1988, p.
35)
There are two considerations concerning theaters of war which are of
use in an analysis of planning and which follow from these characteristics
and from the reality that the only place that a decisive action can occur is on
land by ground forces. The first consideration is the relative importance
among theaters of operations. When fighting a primarily continental enemy,
it is clear that operations in a maritime theater will usually have a supporting
role in the overall course of the war. However, when a nation lacks a
comparative advantage in a primary theater, or when both nations are
deterred from fighting in a primary theater, the activities in secondary
theaters take on a greater importance.
The second consideration for planning is the impact of technology,
especially weapons, transportation, and communications technology. The
impact of ICBMs, manned space vehicles, and satellite communications may
increase the interdependence of theaters of war, but technology still does not
make theaters directly dependent on each other. The decisive element in war
remains the occupation of ground by the armed forces of the victorious
nation. Until the relationship between time and distance becomes
simultaneous and the movement of forces from one theater to another
becomes simultaneous, events in one theater will only indirectly affect events
in another.
The characteristics of a theater governs the nature of operations
within that theater. The operational perspective is also concerned with the
combat which results from the execution of plans within that theater of
operations.
3. Execution
The entire purpose of developing a plan is to achieve in combat an
advantage over the enemy through some combination of surprise, initiative,
and concentration. The existence of the competing will of the enemy and of
the frictions inherent to war leads to uncertainty throughout the execution
phase of a campaign.
The planning process must allow for this dynamic aspect created by
combat, and produce a plan that is flexible. From the operational perspective,
the planning /execution dynamic means that planning does not end with the
articulation of a plan. The commander must continue to shape the situation
through the actions of his forces. The actions of his forces are initially guided
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by his plan, which is then altered through an ongoing process of continued
reassessment and adjustments dictated by a changing situation.
The influence of considerations of joint operations and the theater of
operations can be discerned in the resultant plan, which is then influenced by
the situation created by the execution of that plan in the conduct of the
campaign. This is the method of analysis to be used in the paper, which will
utilize the categories presented above and apply them to three case studies.
C CASES FOR ANALYSIS
Theory itself has little value unless it is rooted in experience. Events of
the past can provide the required experience to apply the above method of
analysis to three cases representative of the relationship between planning
and joint service organizations fighting in a maritime theaters. The three
cases selected are the 1915 British campaign in Turkey, the 1940 German
campaign in Norway, and the 1950 U.S. campaign in Korea. In addition to
each campaign having an historical significance, they are each a theater for
potential U.S. military operations and are each the location of contemporary
U.S. military exercises. The study of the experience of others in war from the
past can illuminate both the conduct of peacetime exercises and the
considerations of a commander in combat.
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II. THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN TURKEY (GALLIPOLI), 1915
Great Britain's attempt to alter the course of the Great War in 1915 by
opening a line of communication with Russia through the Dardanelles failed
on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This campaign is an instance of strategic
brilliance and tactical incompetence. It brought an end to an era of British
foreign policy in which Britain both played the role of power broker to
continental states and developed a global empire based on the combined effect
of naval forces and land forces in combat within a given theater under a
strategic umbrella of maritime powrer wielded by a powerful island nation.
A. BRITISH JOINT SERVICE ORGANIZATION
The parliamentary system of government administered by a cabinet is
often unable to effectively direct efficient military operations in the Modern
Age. In the previous age, British prime ministers had been given wide
latitude in foreign affairs, and through support from business interests, had
created an empire. Expeditions of naval and land forces were conceived and
dispatched at the direction of the prime minister from a central location in
London with the advice of the Admiralty, utilizing written communications
for general guidance and the initiative of subordinates on the scene to
implement policy. A capable minister such as Pitt could execute a grand
strategic plan which would unfold over a period of time.
The success of joint service expeditions depended upon the personalities
of the military and naval commanders and especially their ability to cooperate
to reach a common goal. Command was not vested in a unified commander,
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but decisions were made by each commander in his sphere of naval or land
interest. This could lead to failure such as the Scheldt expedition in 1809, or
could result in huge success such as the Quebec expedition in 1759. A
theoretical framework for joint expeditionary warfare was developed by Sir
Julian Corbet in his work Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, but attempts
by reformers to establish a joint planning agency for combined operations in
1906 was rejected by the navy. (Higgins, 1963, p. 14)
The movement to reform the British military establishment was a result
of the performance of the military during the Boer War (1899-1902),
specifically with regards to failures in planning and direction of operations
and in collection and dissemination of intelligence. The armed forces of the
Empire at this time were subordinate to four separate cabinet offices: the War
Office controlled the army, the Admiralty controlled the navy, the India
Office controlled the Indian Army, and the Secretary of State for Colonies
controlled other colonial forces.
In 1902, the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) was formed to serve as
an advisory body to the Prime Minister. (Gooch, 1986 p. 53) The principal
members of the CID were the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for War,
the First Lord of the Admiralty, the senior officer of both the army and navy,
and other prominent cabinet members. (Guinn, 1965, p. 6) In 1902 a secretariat
was added to the CID; some conceptualized this small secretariat to as a "Great
General Staff" to coordinate the activities of the army and navy to meet the
defense requirements of the Empire. (Gooch, 1986, p. 54) One of the
shortcomings of the CID was that it was convened only at the direction of the
Prime Minister, and not on a regular basis. (Gooch, 1986, p. 54)
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The army carried out further reform. The Army Council, a governing
body to administer the army, was formed in 1904, along with the position of
Chief of the General Staff to serve as the principal military member of the
Council. (Guinn, 1965, p. 7) In 1906 the Secretary of State for War mandated
that a General Staff be formed. The advantages sought were a unified army
position on strategic issues that could be articulated in the forum of the CID,
and the formulation of strategy from a broad national or imperial perspective,
rather than the narrow perspective of the theater of operations. (Guinn, 1965,
p. 7)
The Royal Navy was in the midst of technological reform and was not
interested in organizational reform. Strategic planning was the domain of
the First Sea Lord (the senior naval officer) with assistance from the Director
of Naval Intelligence. (Gooch, 1986, p. 54) A naval staff was eventually forced
upon the navy in 1911 to improve the capability to advise the Prime Minister.
(Higgins, 1963, pp. 35-39; Kennedy, 1983, p. 235)
The CID ceased to function after 25 November 1914 in the aftermath of
the crisis and confusion caused by the outbreak of the war. It was replaced by
the War Council, ostensibly to provide the Cabinet with a greater degree of
control over the conduct of the war. However, it had essentially the same
membership and also met at the request of the Prime Minister. The CID
secretariat provided staff support for the War Council. (Guinn, 1965, 33-34)
Despite the mechanism of the War Council, a unified strategy for the
conduct of the war did not emerge. Decisions were often not final, the
members often spoke in public about their differences, and the Prime
Minister gave substantial independence to the ministers responsible for the
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war effort. This absence of unity was then reflected in the operations of each
of the services. The divergent opinions and actions in the prosecution of the
war and the lack of an agency to coordinate army and navy operations
foreshadowed the failure of the attempted joint service operations at the
Dardanelles. (Guinn, 1965, p. 36)
B. THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS
The global proportions of the 1914-1918 war were inevitable, as it followed
decades of empire-building by Britain, France, Russia, and Germany. Of these
great powers, Britain had the most to gain or loose in areas away from the
continent. At the same time, Britain held better geographic positions and
committed a higher proportion of its national power overseas relative to the
other great powers. In the end, the decisive theater for the western alliance
was in France. However, given the existence of global interests, there
developed a dialogue in Britain between those who wanted to ally the nation
with France to prevent German hegemony on the European continent, and
those who wanted to allow the nation to follow a flexible policy of
maintaining its empire in the Far East, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle
East, and in Africa.
1. Considerations of Empire
Most of the colonies of the British Empire were located on the littoral
of the Eurasian-African landmass of the "world island." Support and
sustenance of these possessions was made possible by the relative superiority
of British sea power, comprised of both commercial and naval components.
Two factors resulted in competition to Britain's position.
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The first factor was the rise of the German nation as an economic and
political power that dominated Central Europe and threatened to become the
primary political influence over all of Europe. The second factor was the
advance of the industrial revolution and the subsequent improvement of
land transportation by railroad. Many high value goods could now be
transported more efficiently by land through the interior of the continent
than by sea along the exterior edges. If a railroad were to be constructed from
Europe, into Asia Minor at Constantinople, and across the Middle East into
China and India, then Britain's commercial status would be compromised.
These two factors reflect both Britain's decline as an industrial and
commercial power and the relative decline of sea power compared to land
power. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 237)
Other threats to Britain appeared as European powers sought their
own empire. China was being divided into Russian, Japanese, French, and
German sectors. The Russian Empire threatened to expand into northwest
India through Afghanistan. Unrest in the Ottoman Empire had the potential
of opening a route for the Russians through the Borporus and the
Dardanelles into the Mediterranean.
If Britain's position were to be analyzed from this perspective, several
strategic objectives would emerge. They would be to oppose Russian
expansionism, encourage instability in the Balkans to prevent German or
Russian domination of that area, and to maintain favorable relations with
Turkey (previously the Ottoman Empire) to protect the Suez Canal and to
serve as a buffer to Russian access to the Mediterranean Sea. Political realities
driven by the onset of war significantly altered these objectives.
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2. Political-Military Considerations
British strategists also faced the perceived threat of Germany in the
years preceding the "Great War." The threat had both a naval and military
component, and resulted in both the naval building program of 1906 and the
development of army war plans to send an expeditionary force to the aid of
France in event of war.
German policy was no more coordinated than British policy. A
coalition of industrialists and admirals created the High Seas Fleet, which
some thought could serve no purpose other than to antagonize the British.
The Royal Navy responded with its own program of naval construction. This
program emphasized dreadnoughts and battle cruisers for the battle line,
rather than less capable ships suitable for policing the Empire and for escort
duty. The fleet changed in composition and in its deployment patterns;
stations overseas were stripped of ships to reinforce the Home Fleet.
(Kennedy, 1983, pp. 217-218)
The army established a close relationship with the French army by
holding a series of secret staff conferences. This was concurrent with the
general thrust of policy established by the British foreign office; the Foreign
Secretary spoke of a moral duty to support France against the aggression of
Germany. With the completion of the Triple Entente in 1907, Britain's
interests were linked first to France and Russia rather than to its empire.
(Kennedy, 1983, pp. 230-237) There was also the desire to ensure the neutrality
of the low countries; strategists believed that a future German offensive
would proceed through Belgium.
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Turkey began to pull away from the British orbit with the rise to
power of the "Young Turks" in 1905, a group of army officers led by Ever
Pasha. They turned to Germany for assistance in rebuilding the Turkish
Army. Britain's rapprochement with France, driven by the Moroccan crises
of 1905-1906, brought Britain into a tacit alliance with Russia, the historical
enemy of Turkey. Further, there were members of the British government
who favored an alliance with Greece rather than Turkey, further straining
Anglo-Turkish relations.
A secret treaty was signed on 2 August 1914 between Germany and
Turkey. The Turks used the period from the outbreak of war until early
November to mobilize before making their intentions known. Great Britain
declared war on Turkey on 31 October 1914.
Germany's attempt to win a quick and decisive victory over France
failed after the Battle of the Marne and the "Race to the Sea." The British
Expeditionary Force had been sent to France to meet British pre-war
commitments, and had managed to avoid annihilation at the hands of the
Germans in the first months of combat. Germany then shifted forces from
the west to the east to fight Russia, leaving sufficient forces in France and
Belgium to defend its gains.
3. British Military Considerations
After the German attempt to achieve a victory in the west failed,
Britain found itself without the means or the strategy to bring the war to a
conclusion. The army became fixated on the Western Front, and the navy
became fixated on the German High Seas Fleet.
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As Britain began to mobilize for war, the army came to consist of four
tiers of forces. In the first tier were units of the regular army; most of them
had been sent to France with the B.E.F. Units of the regular army, generally of
battalion strength, that had been stationed overseas at the beginning of the
war were organized into the 29th Division. Many of the overseas stations
were then garrisoned by Territorial battalions. These had been organized in
the early 1900s for homeland defense. The regular army did not think them
dependable troops, and hesitated to use them on a major front. There were
ten divisions that had not been committed in late 1914. The third tier were
troops from the Empire. The Canadian Division and Indian Division were
employed in France. The Australian and New Zealand Corps of two
divisions debarked in Egypt to conduct final training prior to employment in
France. (Guinn, 1965, pp. 59-60) The fourth tier was the New Army comprised
of patriotic volunteers and organized by the Secretary of State for War, Lord
Kitchener. These forces required equipment and training before they could be
considered ready to deploy; they would not be ready until 1916. The Army
thus faced a perceived shortage of forces and a real shortage of material for
operations in 1915. This had a critical effect on events in the Dardanelles
theater.
The Royal Navy also had a multi-tiered organization. The British
Grand Fleet, comprised of super dreadnoughts and battle cruisers that were
the result of the pre-war naval building program, remained in the North Sea
guarding against a sortie by the German High Seas Fleet. The Grand Fleet was
the decisive arm of the Home Fleet, to which two thirds of the ships of the
Royal Navy had been assigned. The rest of the Home Fleet consisted of
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"obsolete" battleships, and destroyers and submarines required for escort and
scouting operations. The Admiralty sought to maintain a margin of
superiority over the High Sea Fleet as a contingency. It was the size of this
margin that dictated the numbers of ships deployed to other theaters. A final
tier consisted of specialized ships being built for amphibious operations.
These were shallow-draft monitors for shore bombardment and armored
steam lighters for the landing of troops to support Admiral Fisher's proposed
landing operations on the coast of Belgium with British troops, or in the
Baltic with Russian troops transported in British ships. These proposals were
not considered feasible by the War Council, and some of these assets were
used in the later stages of the Dardanelles Campaign.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary advocated a "Southern
Strategy." Two proposals, which were rejected, were to attack Austria at the
head of the Adriatic Sea or through Salonika, Greece. The Adriatic option
was not thought feasible because of the submarine threat and because of the
lack of bases in the area without Italy in the war. The Salonika option also
had political problems: Greece would not enter the war against Austria unless
assured of Bulgarian neutrality; Bulgaria was concerned about a Turkish
attack, and remained uncommitted to either the Entente or the Central
Powers at that time.
Turkey then emerged as a threat to Entente interests. The main
Turkish effort was an offensive in the Caucasus mountains to recover
Georgia from Russia. This was made by the 3rd Turkish Army of three
divisions. The British Indian Army moved to protect the Persian Gulf oil
fields with one division that was opposed by three Turkish divisions. The
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Turks also had a force of three divisions in Palestine, which threatened
British control of the Suez Canal. The British forces in Egypt consisted of
70,000 inexperienced troops. (James, 1965, p. 17)
British attention came to be focused on Turkey in December 1914
when Russia asked for a military demonstration to relieve pressure on its
forces in the Caucasus region. Lord Kitchener inquired if the Navy could
respond to the Russian request for assistance, as he had no troops to spare.
Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty immediately saw the strategic
possibilities of operations in the Straits against Turkey by the fleet, but
ignored the operational and tactical difficulties expressed by his Admirals.
C DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
The British government, and in the larger context the Entente, was not
structured to provide unified direction and supervision for the planning of
the conduct of the war. Within the fragmented system of the government,
compromise between factions could result in the initiation of a military
action without the benefit of a careful consideration of means required to
sustain that action until the desired ends could be achieved. In the case of the
Dardanelles campaign, the Russian request for assistance elicited from the
British the articulation of a set of goals to be achieved if the objective of the
capitulation of Constantinople was accomplished.
The major goal was to turn the southern flank of the Central Powers to
contain the war in Europe. From this would flow other benefits, for example,
tightening the blockade of the Central Powers; bringing the Balkan countries
and Italy firmly onto the side of the Entente; forcing Turkey out of the war
with the control of Constantinople, which was the economic, political, and
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military center of the nation; eliminating the threat to Egypt, the Persian Gulf,
and India; and opening direct communications with Russia to trade Allied
munitions for Russian grain. (Puleston, 1926, p. 11)
Different opinions emerged among the British political and military
leadership concerning the viability of a naval-only operation against
Constantinople. Some thought that the fleet, once through the defenses and
into the Sea of Marmora, could easily defeat the Turkish navy and appear
before Constantinople, which would lead to a wide-spread revolt against the
Young Turks. (Boswell, 1965, p. 144) Another opinion held that the fleet
would require assistance by ground forces to neutralize the Turkish forts, and
therefore advocated a combined operation to land troops on the Gallipoli
Peninsula. Some felt that no attempt in the Straits should be made unless it
was done in conjunction with a Russian landing operation from the Black
Sea into Turkey near the Bosporus. Finally, there were those who believed
that any fleet action against coastal guns protected by minefields was futile
and should not be attempted. All of these opinions, freely expressed by
members of the government and military experts, competed with another
prevalent assessment that Britain should not dissipate its strength in side-
shows. General Sir John French, commanding the British Expeditionary
Force in France, wrote a report to the government leadership advocating the
primacy of the Western Front. He claimed that although the allies could not
win a war on the Western Front, as Russia and the Eastern Front was the
decisive theater at that time, the Allies could loose the war if Britain did not
concentrate all of its available strength to aid France. (Corbett, 1921, pp. 62-63)
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The sequence of events dictated the means to be used once the War
Council approved, at the urging of Churchill, a naval attack on the
Dardanelles with contingent support by ground forces if the situation dictated.
On 16 February 1915, Churchill ordered the fleet commanders to make
preparations, and he detailed Rear Admiral Wemyss to make preparations for
the site of a future base, if required, on the island of Lemnos. The naval
attack on the Turkish forts began on 19 February 1915.
1. Turkish Defenses at the Dardanelles
When Great Britain had declared war on Turkey on 31 October 1914,
it had conducted a short bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the
Straits. This had alerted the Turks and Germans to the vulnerability of the
defenses and the need to strengthen them. (Hart, 1930, p. 146)
Under the improved system, the defenses were divided into three
zones. At the entrance to the Straits were the outer defenses, which were
comprised of a main fort and a support fort on both the European and Asian
side. There was a total of four guns with ranges of 14,800 meters and twenty
guns with ranges of 7,500 meters. The intermediate defense zone, between
the entrance to the Straits and the Narrows, was built after the allied
bombardment on 3 November 1914. This consisted of mobile field guns
transported on roads along the shore, and moored mines. If a fleet got
through the outer zone, the mines would stop the fleet; if the enemy tried to
sweep the mines, then the field guns on the shore would damage the light
minesweepers. At the Narrows there were seventy-eight guns (eight large
caliber, long-range guns and seventy smaller caliber, medium-to-short-range
guns) in permanent fortifications. There were also minefields and a shore
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torpedo battery. This inner zone was the final barrier before reaching the Sea
of Marmara. (Puleston, 1926, pp. 24-25)
2. The British Naval Attack
After receiving the admiralty order to force the Straits with the fleet,
Vice Admiral Carden began a phased operation to methodically neutralize
the Turkish defenses with gunfire from battleships and minesweeping
operations. The first phase was to conduct a long-range (12,000 yards)
bombardment of the entrance forts, then a medium-range (5,000-10,000 yards)
bombardment, then direct, overwhelming fire at short-range (3,000-5,000
yards) to completely reduce the forts. At that time, landing parties would be
put ashore to complete the destruction of the guns. This phase began on 19
February 1915. (Puleston, 1926, pp. 25-26)
The first attack was inconclusive; counter-fire from the forts drove
the ships away. The fleet reassessed the situation, altered tactics, and prepared
for another attempt. Bad weather delayed further operations until 25
February. The second attack was successful in destroying the forts, and
minesweeping operations in the intermediate zone began that night.
The second phase of the fleet operation was to clear the minefields so
that the battleships could reduce the forts of the inner zone with the same
tactics used in the outer zone. The minesweeping operations continued from
25 February to 17 March, often interrupted by bad weather. The fire from the
field guns did little physical damage, but had a psychological effect on the
crews of the minesweepers.
The minesweeping was proceeding at too slow of a pace for Churchill,
so the third phase began before the second was complete. Sufficient sea room
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had been cleared of mines so that the battleships could position for the
bombardment. In the new plan, further minesweeping would be done in
conjunction with the bombardment. Unknown to the fleet, the Turks had
laid a new minefield in the maneuver area for the battleships. (Puleston, pp.
37-40, 46)
The renewed attack on 18 March was led by Vice Admiral de Robeck
who replaced the invalided Carden. Operations were proceeding as planned,
with the ships inflicting substantial damage on the forts at the Narrows. As
the attack continued, the battleships came upon the new minefield; three
ships were sunk and three were damaged. The fleet then withdrew for the
day. The impact of losing a portion of his major warships convinced the
admiral that another attack should not be made. The Turks had suffered
considerable damage, armor piercing ammunition for the larger guns was
almost depleted, and the minesweepers had cleared a channel up to the
Narrows forts. Rather than continue a naval attack, a combined operation
was approved to capture the European Narrows from land, then allow the
fleet to pass into the Sea of Marmara leaving the Army to remain on the
Gallipoli Peninsula to protect the fleet's lines of communication. (Keyes, 1943,
pp. 39-41)
3. Allocation of British Ground Forces
After much deliberation, Lord Kitchener finally made the decision to
commit the 29th Division to the Mediterranean rather than to France.
Additional units of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force included the
Australian and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC) of two divisions that had been
training in Egypt, the 1st Division provided by the French from their colonial
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forces, and the Royal Naval Division provided by the Admiralty. General Sir
Ian Hamilton was assigned to command the ground forces of the expedition.
The 29th Division began to leave England on 10 March for the base at
Port Mudros on the island of Lemnos being developed by Rear Admiral
Wymess. Hamilton found that the division had not been combat-loaded
onto the transports in England; the ships had been loaded to make efficient
use of space in the hull rather than in a manner that they could be
sequentially off-loaded in a combat zone to support a landing and to sustain
operations on shore. There were not adequate port facilities and cargo
handling equipment on Lemnos to reconfigure the load, so all transports
were sent to Alexandria, Egypt. The reconfiguration was expected to be
completed in time for a landing in mid-April, but complications resulted in a
further delay of two weeks. (Hart, 1930, pp. 156)
4. Turkish Defenses on the Gallipoli Peninsula
The Turkish Army totaled 400,000 men organized into fifty divisions.
The Turks stationed approximately twenty-two reserve divisions in the
center of the country in the region around the city of Ankara. To the east,
south, and west in the Caucasus region, Mesopotamia, and Palestine were
forces fighting the Russians and British. There were three armies deployed to
protect the capital: one with headquarters in Adrianpole of five divisions
along the Bulgarian border, the 6th Army of six divisions guarding the
Bosporus against the Russian attack, and, at the time of the 25 April landing,
the 5th Army of six divisions guarding the Dardanelles. (Puleston, 1926, pp.
56-57)
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After the allied naval attack of 18 March, the commander of the
Turkish Army appointed General Liman von Sanders, a German military
advisor, to command the 5th Army and to restore order in the Dardanelles
theater. They believed a subsequent attack was shortly forthcoming.
Sanders found the 5th Army deployed in a "cordon system" of
defense along a sixty mile front from Xeros Bay to Bashika Bay. The Turks
were trying to defend forward positions everywhere; as a result they were
weak along the entire front, and could not maneuver quickly enough to mass
forces at the point of attack because of the rough terrain and poor
communications. Sanders reorganized his forces by concentrating each
division in the interior of the theater away from the coast. He built
additional roads and trails in the interior, and entrenchments at obvious
points of attack. He allowed small units to be stationed along the coast which
would serve to delay a landing until the defenders could be reinforced by
reserves. He also strengthened the defenses at Bulair, where the Gallipoli
Peninsula joins the mainland; he felt that this was the most vulnerable
position on the Gallipoli Peninsula subject to British attack from the sea.
5. Alternative Courses of Action
Hamilton was faced with a variety of practical problems as he
considered various courses of action. The planning for the landing and
follow-on operation was conducted with scant information about the enemy
and with inaccurate maps of the Peninsula. The only information available
was a 1912 handbook of the Turkish Army, a pre-war report on the
Dardanelles forts, and one inaccurate map. (Hart, 1930, p. 156)
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The directive issued by Kitchener giving guidelines for the land
operations forbade any major actions on the Asiatic shore of the Straits.
Although the potential existed for a landing in Besika Bay and a rapid
movement to the rear of the Asiatic forts, the fleet would be unable to
provide direct support for much of the Army's advance. A second
alternative, that was dismissed by Hamilton and his staff, would have landed
forces at Bulair and captured the narrow neck of the Peninsula. This would
have trapped the Turkish forces to the south stationed on the Peninsula;
however, this would put the fleet out of position both to support the landing
and to operate against the Dardanelles. The landing also would be against
very strong, prepared enemy positions, and it would place the inferior Allied
army within reach of three Turkish armies. (Hamilton, 1921, p. 95)
The only alternative remaining was to land on the western shore of
the Gallipoli Peninsula. There were three general landing areas: Sulva Bay,
Gaba Tepe, and Cape Helles. The navy had insufficient hydrographic data on
conditions at Sulva Bay, and it was at the widest point of the Peninsula, away
from the forts at the Narrows, so this alternative was quickly dismissed.
Hamilton decided on landings at Gaba Tepe, as a major feint, and at Cape
Helles as the main effort. (Hamilton, 1921, pp. 98-99)
The other dimension of selecting alternatives was when to attack.
Hamilton was intent on attacking as soon as his forces had been reconfigured
and reorganized and as soon as an adequate detailed plan was developed by
his staff and accepted by the Navy. These preparations required a considerable
period of time, during which the Turks continued to improve their defensive
system on the peninsula. Had Hamilton attacked in March, he would have
28
faced only one Turkish division on the Peninsula. However, in his
estimation, the risks of attacking without a systematic plan to off-load his
disorganized forces from the transports onto a hostile shore were too great.
D. THE PLAN
All preparations were completed by 20 April for a landing on 23 April, but
a storm delayed the landing until 25 April. The majority of the force was
assembled at Port Mudros, while the Royal Naval Division and its transports
had established a base at Skyros. The plan was to depart the anchorage two
days before the assault to move to the operation zones. The day prior to the
assault, the assault troops would be transferred to ships of the attendant force
for each zone. Hours before the landing they would then be transferred to
small boats.
The terrain of the Gallipoli Peninsula was unsuitable for rapid offensive
operations against determined resistance. The area was underdeveloped,
with a small population and little cultivation. There were few roads and an
inadequate water supply. The weather on the Peninsula varies between
extreme cold in winter and extreme heat in summer.
The operations area for the landing was dominated by a prominent
heights, the most important for the Allied scheme of maneuver were Achi
Baba, Sari Bahr and Kalid Bahr. The Turks had developed defenses on the
Peninsula on the Kalid Bahr plateau, which was the key to control of the
European forts at the Narrows. Entrenchments were extended from the
plateau to Kakma Dagh ridge to the north and to the hills of Achi Baba to the
south. A forward line of entrenchments crossed the southern tip of the
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Peninsula which included Achi Baba and the town of Krithia. (Corbett, 1920,
p. 305)
The coastline consists of cliffs broken by rough gulleys leading into the
interior. The few beaches suitable for landing operations were neither wide
nor deep, barely suitable for support of the assault. Although the Turks had
instituted a flexible defense, small contingents with machine guns protected
by barbed wire were stationed at the most likely landing beaches.
1. Scheme of Maneuver
Landing on a hostile shore in the face of opposition required the
development of specialized assault techniques. The size of the beaches and
the shortage of small boats meant that the troops assigned to a particular
beach must land in waves. The first waves were designated the "covering
force;" they were to seize the beach and advance to a position to cover the
completion of the landing. (Corbett, 1920, p. 312) Successive waves were to
land to build up combat power, then advance inland to capture assigned
objectives.
The units of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had the
following assignments (James, 1965, pp. 85-89; Pules ton, 1926, pp. 62-87;
Hamilton, 1920, pp. 95-100):
29th Infantry Division: The covering force was to land at Cape Helles
after sunrise at Y Beach (2,250 men in 2 waves), X Beach (3,050 men in 3
waves), W Beach (3,900 men in 4 waves),V Beach (3,200 men in 1 wave and
via the River Clyde, and S Beach (800 men in 1 wave). The objective on the
first day was to capture Achi Baba. Follow-on units of the Division were to
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form the western end of the Allied front during the general advance to
occupy Kalid Bahr and the Narrows forts.
ANZAC Corps: The covering force of 4,000 men in 3 waves was to
begin landing at dawn 1 mile north of Gaba Tepe. The objective for the first
day was to advance rapidly inland to capture the Sari Bair heights and Mai
Tepe. These positions were to be subsequently reinforced to form a blocking
force across the Peninsula to prevent Turkish reinforcements from reaching
the landing at Cape Helles.
1st French Infantry Division: One regiment was to land at the town of
Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore to capture coast artillery in order to prevent
disruption of the landing at Cape Helles. The remainder of the Division was
to conduct a demonstration in Bashika Bay to delay reinforcement of the
Gallipoli Peninsula by Turkish troops deployed on the southern side of the
Straits. Upon completion of these operations, the Division was to debark at
Cape Helles to take position in the eastern end of the Allied front line in time
for the general advance to occupy Kalid Bahr and to capture the Narrows
forts.
Royal Naval Division: The Division was to conduct a demonstration
in Xeros (Saros) Bay off of Bulair to delay Turkish reinforcement of the
assault area in the south. Upon completion, the Division was to debark at
Cape Helles to take position in the middle of the Allied front line in time for
the general advance to occupy Kalid Bahr and to capture the Narrows forts.
The entire landing force was to be landed over a period of two-and-a-
half days. The timetable for the main assault from Cape Helles was as follows
(Boswell, 1965, p. 147):
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Day 1: Land and take Achi Baba.
Day 2: Occupy Kilid Bahr plateau.
Day 3: Occupy the European forts at the Narrows.
Hamilton believed in a decentralized method of command and
control to a fault. Once his plan was promulgated, his subordinate division
commanders devised their own supporting plans. More crucially, once the
landing had begun, the direction of the battle was in the hands of the division
commanders. The campaign would suffer severe consequences for this
detached involvement by the senior commander.
2. Supporting Forces
Sir Julian Corbett framed a theoretical doctrine concerning the
composition of expeditionary forces based on the past practice of Great Britain.
(Corbett, 1911, pp. 285-310) Under this doctrine the fleet not only must assure
freedom of passage (working command of the sea), but must also perform
duties of support. A combined expedition consists of four components: (1)
the army, (2) the transports and landing craft, (3) escort ships for direct
protection of the landing force and for "inshore work", and (4) the covering
squadron. (Corbett, 1911, p. 289) These four components are functionally
separate, but not necessarily physically separate. "But so essentially is. . . (a
combined expedition). . . a single organism, that in practice these various
elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. They may be interwoven in the
most intricate manner. Indeed to a greater or less extent each will always
have to discharge some of the functions of the others." (Corbett, 1911, p. 289)
Although joint doctrine was not approved by either service, the logic of
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Corbett's framework was evident in the organization of the supporting forces.
However, the ability of the combined force to act as a single organism was lost
on both military and naval theater commanders and on the political
leadership in London as the campaign unfolded.
a. Naval Forces
The enemy naval threat in the Eastern Mediterranean in April
1915 was negligible. Most of the Turkish navy was stationed to defend against
the Russians, and was prevented from interdicting the landing by the mines
in the Straits. Some torpedo boats were stationed at Smyrna, and had
conducted some minor operations against Allied communications between
Alexandria and the base at Port Mudros on Lemnos. The blockade of the
Adriatic Sea by the elements of the French fleet prevented interference by
Austrian submarines.
The Allied navy did not have specialized amphibious transports.
Merchant ships taken up from trade served as both logistic and troop
transports. A division required approximately twenty-five transports for
troops, equipment, munitions, mules, and supplies. (Corbett, 1920, p. 308) The
covering force of the assault waves were initially embarked in transports,
then transferred to naval ships the day prior to the assault, as they provided
greater protection to the troops as the force closed the shore.
The naval ships in the immediate theater and available for the
operation were divided into squadrons, each squadron was assigned to a
specific geographic zone of operations to support the initial landings. Each
squadron was further divided into a "covering force" and an "attendant
force." The ships of the "covering force" were to provide naval gunfire
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support before and during the landing operations. The ships of the
"attendant force" carried the advance echelons of the covering troops of the
ground landing force (Corbett, 1920, pp. 312-313) At about three hours prior to
the scheduled time ashore at a distance of five nautical miles from the beach,
the troops would debark from the ships of the "attendant force" into lines of
small boats which would be towed towards the shore by the ships of the
"attendant force." At two-and-a-half nautical miles from the shore, steam
launches would pick-up the tow. Finally, the small boats would be cast off
fifty yards from shore and rowed to the beach through the surf line. (Hart,
1930, pp. 163-164)
One exception to the above method of ship-to-shore movement
was the collier River Clyde. This vessel was modified with portals in the side
of the hull. It was to be grounded on the beach and a causeway, supported by
small boats, constructed onto the beach to allow troops to debark from the
portals. The 2,000 troops of the second wave at V Beach were to be landed in
this manner.
The organization of the Allied navy and assignments to zones of
operations were as follows (Corbert, 1920, pp. 310-312):
First Squadron, consisting of eight battleships, four cruisers, and
six fleet minesweepers, was to sortie from Port Mudros and support the 29th
Division landing at Cape Helles.
Second Squadron, consisting of five battleships, one cruiser, eight
destroyers, four trawlers, and three auxiliaries, was to sortie from Port
Mudros and support the ANZAC Corps landing north of Gaba Tepe.
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Third Squadron, consisting of one battleship, two cruisers, two
destroyers, and two trawlers, was to sortie from Skyros and support the
demonstration by the Royal Naval Division in Xeros Bay in front of Bulair.
Fourth Squadron, consisting of two cruisers and twelve trawlers,
was to sortie from Port Mudros and be attached to the First Squadron.
Fifth Squadron, consisting of one battleship, ten destroyers, three
minesweepers, and two trawlers (to lay anti-submarine nets), was to sortie
from Port Mudros and operate inside the Straits to sweep mines and lay
netting to protect the ships operating in the zones off Cape Helles and Kum
Kale.
Sixth Squadron, consisting of three battleships, four cruisers,
seven destroyers, and five torpedo boats, was to support the diversionary
landing at Kum Kale by elements of the 1st French Division and concurrently
support the demonstration by the remainder of the Division in Bashika Bay.
Seventh Squadron, consisting of four destroyers and one armed
yacht, was to operate off the Turkish naval base at Smyrna to guard against
torpedo boat attack.
b. Air Forces
Allied aircraft and balloons provided a limited amount of combat
support. Total assets included eighteen British and eighteen French land
planes based on the island of Tenedos, sea planes attached to the navy units,
and ship-tethered observation balloons. The primary purpose of this
rudimentary "air power" was for reconnaissance and gunfire spotting. There
were some German aircraft on the Peninsula, but they were overwhelmed by
the relatively larger numbers of Allied planes. The British also experimented
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with methods of bombarding troops, which had mostly psychological effects
against the enemy.
E CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN
The land campaign would last from the initial assault on 25 April 1915
until the evacuation on 9 January 1916, but in hindsight, it was lost in the first
hours of the landing. A combination of bad luck, technical and tactical
miscalculation, and major failures in command style and troop control
contributed to the Allied loss in this campaign.
The first Allied troops ashore on the Gallipoli Peninsula were of the
ANZAC Corps and they landed before dawn. The ship-to-shore movement
was marred by confusion in the dark and an unexpected current which set the
boats one mile north of the intended beach center. The first wave proceeded
to move inland against light resistance as planned, but the unexpectedly
rough terrain hindered the momentum of the advance. As the follow-on
waves debarked at the same beach, they also attempted to advance inland to
the desired objectives. Control over the battle could not be coordinated in the
confusion; successful attacks could not be supported because the location of
units was uncertain and communication was unreliable in the broken
ground beyond the beach.
An intense counterattack by Turkish infantry at mid-day stopped the
advance. Continued counterattacks supported by artillery allowed the Turks
to regain lost ground. The Allies failed to coordinate the naval gunfire that
was available. The close proximity of the enemy to friendly troops prevented
effective fire to break up the Turkish counterattacks. By evening, both the
Allied and Turkish troops on the front lines were exhausted, and the lines
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stabilized. In the rear area on the beach, groups of soldiers that had become
detached from their units and disoriented by the terrain caused further
congestion making the landing of follow-on troops, supplies, and material
difficult.
The landings at Cape Helles were timed to take place after dawn, preceded
by naval bombardment of the landing beaches. This gunfire did not knock
out a sufficient number of the machine gun emplacements at W Beach and V
Beach. These two beaches were at the tip of the Peninsula, and considered the
primary landings. As the first waves were decimated by machine gun fire and
the survivors pinned to the beach, mental paralysis of the 29th Division
commander, General Hunter-Weston focused his attention on disaster rather
than opportunity.
The number of Turks actually opposite the landing forces was only at
battalion strength, although this was unknown to the allies because of poor
intelligence. The Allies had landed on a sufficiently wide front, so that the
landings on Y Beach and S Beach met no opposition. Had these forces
advanced aggressively inland they would have cut off the Turkish defenders
and captured key terrain. However, the commanders of the landing forces at
the beaches received no orders to advance during the day nor during the pre-
landing briefings. Had the importance of seizing opportunity been
communicated to these troop commanders, the nature of the entire campaign
would have been altered. Instead, the troops at Y Beach made an
unsuccessful attempt to link with the forces at X Beach to the south. Turkish
reinforcements, moving to support the battle at V Beach, surprised the
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disorganized British forces, and a withdrawal from the beach was effected the
next morning without the knowledge of higher headquarters.
Hamilton had seen the opportunity at Y Beach from the deck of his
command ship, but not wanting to interfere with his subordinate's direction
of the battle, had merely sent a cryptic message to Hunter-Weston offering
additional landing craft to support Y Beach. The division commander
ignored the message and concentrated on the tough fight at V Beach and W
Beach; as forces came available as they returned from the demonstrations at
Bulair and Besika Bay, the British commanders reinforced failure at V Beach
and W Beach rather than success at Y Beach and S Beach.
Prior to their insertion at Cape Helles, the Royal Naval Division and the
1st Division had demonstrated at Bulair and Besika Bay to confuse the enemy
as to the intended main point of attack. These demonstrations had the
desired effect. General von Sanders immediately went to Bulair upon being
made aware of the landings in the south, and delayed major commitment of
reserves in that direction as he waited for the perceived main attack to
develop. (Hart, 1930, p. 173) Despite the delay, the Allied landings failed to
gain ground against a few defenders.
The objective for the first day was to reach Achi Baba; all that was
achieved was the capture of the beaches. The next day, additional troops were
put ashore in preparation for an advance on 27 April. This attack made some
gains, and consolidated rear area of the beachhead, but faltered in the face of
fierce counterattacks by Turkish reserves before reaching the objective. The
Allies had used up all available reserves of troops and ammunition in this
effort, which had caused great casualties on both sides. Entrenchments were
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constructed at both the ANZAC and Cape Helles beachheads, with the Turks
also entrenching in close proximity to the Allied lines to deter the use of
naval bombardment.
Positions remained static while Hamilton pleaded with Kitchener for
replacements for the losses that the M.E.F. had sustained, and for adequate
reinforcements, supplies, and material to resume the offensive. No
additional forces were forthcoming for a period of six weeks, and the Gallipoli
Peninsula became a microcosm of the trench warfare of the Western Front.
On 6 August Hamilton attempted to regain the offensive on the ground with
a main attack out of the ANZAC beachhead and landings of two New Army
divisions in Sulva Bay. Although the beachhead was expanded along the
coast, the Turks continued to hold the crucial terrain in the interior.
Hamilton was relieved in October and replaced by General Sir Charles Monro.
After an assessment of the situation, and despite a proposal by the Chief of
Staff of the fleet, Commodore Keyes, to renew the naval attacks in the Straits,
Monro recommended to Kitchener an evacuation of the Peninsula. The
request to evacuate was approved on 23 November; a detailed plan was
devised and Allied forces were evacuated, with no casualties, on 8-9 January
1916.
F. ANALYSIS
The Turkish campaign of 1915 was based on a brilliant and feasible
strategic concept. However, through indecision at both the strategic and
tactical levels, the campaign resulted in failure. This can be in part ascribed to
a lack of an operational perspective at all levels of leadership. The following
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analysis of how British strategic direction and the theater of operations led to
a plan which provided a framework for the conduct of the campaign.
A unified military organization to administrate Great Britain's armed
forces did not exist in 1915. The lowest permanent level of coordination
between the services was at the cabinet level of the government. At the
cabinet level, the armed forces were unified, both administratively, through
the War Minister and the First Sea Lord, and operationally, through the
efforts of the Committee of Imperial Defense. As is usually the case in
democratic systems of government, strategic direction was often a matter of
partisan domestic politics as much as international politics. By the early
Twentieth Century, the increasingly complex business of government led to a
larger bureaucracy, more subject to political infighting than in the days of
William Pitt.
Despite the lack of consistent centralized direction, relations between
army and navy officers was characterized by cooperation and mutual high
regard. Additionally, although a systematic joint doctrine was not in effect,
British theorists had written on the subject. It appears that in this case there
was no direct correlation between the absence of a formal administrative and
operational unified military organization and the ability of British army and
naval officers to plan and organize a joint operation in a maritime theater.
The indecisiveness of the political and military leadership at the strategic
level resulted in a misallocation of forces to the East Mediterranean theater of
operations. The concept of an operation to capture the center of Turkish
political, military, and economic power to reduce pressure on British imperial
possessions and open communications with Russia was sound, although it
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could have no direct effect on the situation facing the Entente on either the
Western or Eastern Fronts. However, the means required were not
adequately considered. Since the plan originated in the Admiralty, only
naval forces were initially available to capture Constantinople. The naval
attacks to force the Straits failed, so army forces were then committed to the
theater. The flawed deployment of these forces from Great Britain was the
cause of a further delay in operations, because of the requirement to unload
and reembark the forces in Egypt. Ground operations then became the sole
focus of military effort in the theater. The long delay between the initial
naval attacks and the subsequent ground force attack allowed the Turks to
strengthen the defenses in the theater, which contributed to the failure of the
eventual ground force attack. These ineffective and sequential naval-then-
ground operations were the result of the indecision of the high-level
political-military leadership. Thus, the theater was established to organize
military operations to gain a strategic objective, but it was misused as a tool to
match the ends and means of national strategy.
The combination of a lack of a high-level joint service organization to
promote the type of operation required to succeed in Turkey and the
uncertain allocation of forces to the theater over a period of time, led to a
mismatch between the capabilities of forces assigned and the campaign
objectives. This mismatch may have contributed to the failure of the military
leadership in the theater to exploit the advantages of ground force and naval
force cooperation.
Even after the failure of the naval-only operation to force the Straits, a
plan oriented to a more aggressive cooperation between the services may
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have defeated von Sanders' flexible defense. Possibilities included: (1) the
coordination of naval gunfire support and improved spotting procedures
which could have been the margin of difference in subsequent ground
operations; (2) the mobility and flexibility of ground forces in the entire
theater, which could have been enhanced by the utilization of naval forces to
assist in maneuver; and (3) the improved minesweeping techniques
developed by the Royal Navy, after the removal of civilian personnel from
those operations, which may have then allowed the fleet to force a passage
through the Straits.
Without these improvements, Hamilton's plan still might have
succeeded. He organized his forces carefully and developed a close
cooperation between ground and naval forces for the assault through
decentralized organization into integrated task groups for each beach.
However, this desirable principle of decentralization was carried too far in
combat, when Hamilton allowed his subordinates to concentrate on
immediate and narrow concerns and did not override their actions by taking
bold and decisive action at Y Beach to alter the original plan for the assault.
In the final analysis, victory in the Turkish campaign was not beyond the
reach of the British. Indecisiveness at the strategic level led to the theater
commanders having to contend with additional obstacles. The ensuing joint
operational plan was adequate, but it did not meet the test of combat because
of a rigid command style and the failure of subordinate commanders to
comprehend the overall intent of the operation.
Some thought that the lesson of the Gallipoli landings was that joint
operations were not effective in most any situation. Thirty-five years later,
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the German campaign in Norway proved otherwise, when they combined
ground, sea, and air forces in a brilliantly successful military operation.
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III. THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY, 1940
The probability of Germany successfully conquering Norway in early 1940
seemed remote. Economically essential to Germany's war effort, Norway was
not contiguous to Germany, and therefore thought to be safe from the threat
of the German army. The German fleet was small, and designed primarily for
commerce raiding and coastal defense rather than sea control and power
projection. The combination of land, sea, and air power, integrated by a
flexible plan, contributed to this German success, illustrating the potential of a
joint service campaign in a maritime theater of operations by an armed force
dominated by the army.
A. GERMAN JOINT SERVICE ORGANIZATION
A revolution in military organizational concepts occurred in the 1930s
when Germany created the Armed Forces High Command (OKW); this
separate headquarters lay above the Army High Command (OKH), the Navy
High Command (OKM), and the Air Force High Command (OKL).
(Warlimont, "Reflections", 1979, p. 30) The OKW had dual functions: to
coordinate the strategic operations of the three services and to ensure an
adequate allocation of Germany's economic resources to each service.
(Warlimont, "Reflections", 1979, p. 31) As OKW was originally conceived, the
head of the OKW had both command and ministerial functions as the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and as the Reich Defense Minister.
The OKW was to be both an interface between the political and economic
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sectors for the armed forces, and a centralized agency to direct the efforts of
the three services.
On 4 February 1938, Adolf Hitler assumed "...direct command powers
over the entire Wehrmacht in person." (Warlimont, "Commentary", 1979, p.
15) OKW was designated to serve as Hitler's military staff. The consequences
of this action served to combine the head of state and the head of the armed
forces in one man. The OKW was never given a chance to function in a war
as intended at its inception because after February 1938 each of the armed
service chiefs reported directly to Hitler. The German military as a result was
unified in the person of the head of state, rather than in the organization of
the OKW. The lack of a unifying agency in the German armed forces during
the 1939-1945 war left Germany without a consistent military strategy and
with unresolved inter-service rivalries.
The Norwegian Campaign serves as a prime example of an inconsistent
military strategy. It was almost an afterthought to the prosecution of the war
in the west. Of the many unique characteristics of the campaign, one that
stands out is the role of the OKW and the combined use of the armed
services. An inter-service staff was formed within OKW to plan and conduct
the campaign, and each of the services played a prominent role during the
subsequent fighting. However, the success of this joint service task force was
due only in part to the centralized planning of the OKW staff. It can mostly
be attributed to the professionalism of the officer corps of the German armed
forces leading to an attitude of cooperation among unit commanders and staff
officers (Van der Porten, 1969, p. 66)
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B. THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS
The campaign in Norway and Denmark in 1940 is an example of a
brilliant combined operation in both plan and execution. An understanding
of some of the issues considered in the deliberations of the German political
and military leadership which led to the decision to conduct a combined
operation in a maritime theater will result in a greater appreciation of the
plan. Some of the considerations of the German leadership can be grouped
into three categories: (1) economic considerations of ensuring the continued
transport of Swedish iron ore through Narvik, Norway; (2) political-military
considerations of future enemy actions; and (3) strategic-military
considerations concerning the conduct of the war.
1. Economic Considerations
Sweden was a principal source of iron ore for German industry.
Germany had contracted with Sweden to provide ten million tons of iron ore
during 1940, and with Norway to provide one to two million tons. The main
source of iron ore in Sweden came from the Kiruna-Gallivare district in the
north near the Finnish boarder. The bulk of the ore was shipped through the
port of Lulea, on the Gulf of Bothnia ("the Baltic route"); however, from mid-
December to mid-April, that port was closed by ice. This would leave a two
million ton shortfall, enough to bring German industry to a standstill. Ore
could also be transported from Sweden into the town of Narvik, Norway by
railroad, then loaded onto ships and brought down the intercoastal waterway
known as the Inner Leads without leaving the territorial waters of neutral
Norway and therefore out of the legal reach of the British navy. (Butler, 1957,
pp. 91-92) The German Naval Staff believed that maintenance of Norwegian
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neutrality was the most effective means of protecting vital German ore
shipments. (Admiralty, 1948, p. 3)
2. Political-Military Considerations
The neutrality of Norway could be threatened by enemy actions and
have adverse political-military consequences. After war was declared in the
Autumn of 1939, the British and French governments first assumed that
German economy was too weak to support a prolonged war. Second, they
wished to deter Germany from attacking into France and the Low Countries.
To act on the assumption of a weak Germany, the Allies sought the means to
further weaken the German economy by depriving it of vital resources
needed for its war industries. To deter a German attack to the west, they
began to reinforce the Allied armies on the continent. Additionally, the
Allies believed that fighting on a secondary front would be preferable to
fighting in France.
The possibility of an expedition to Narvik and Trondheim held the
attention of the British planners. A force could establish bases and capture
the ore loading facilities while out of the effective reach of German air and
sea power. The existence of Allied forces in Scandinavia could entice
Germany to commit forces into Sweden and Southern Norway, reducing
available manpower for an invasion of France. Another possibility was to lay
mines in the Leads, forcing the ore ships out of protected waters onto the high
seas. Either action would be a violation of Norway's neutrality; Allied
diplomats, however, could not convince Norway to repudiate that neutrality.
Finland appealed to the League of Nations for assistance after the
Soviets initiated hostilities on 30 November 1939 and caused Britain and
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France to pledge their support to her. The Allies then faced the same
situation as two months earlier during the German attack on Poland—the
direct route through the Baltic was controlled by Germany. The British
combined staff, in conjunction with French military planners, drew up plans
to land three brigades (two British and one French) in Norway in March 1940.
(Butler, 1957, p. 109; Mouton,1967, p. 50) The objective of this expedition was
to aid Finland and to simultaneously ensure that the Gullivare ore fields
were denied to Germany and the Soviet Union for as long as possible. This
was to be accomplished by securing a base at Narvik, capturing the railroad
into Sweden, and concentrating a force in Swedish territory at a location
allowing it to accomplish the "ultimate objective." (Butler, 1957, p. 113) The
reaction of Norway and Sweden to the violation of their neutrality was hoped
to be mild. The Allied operation was cancelled when the Finns accepted
Soviet terms for ending the war on 13 March 1940. (Butler, 1957, p. 113)
Convinced that political considerations would prevent them from
taking aggressive action, the Allies developed two plans which they could
execute in reaction to any potential German occupation. One was Plan
Wilfred, the mining of the Leads. The other was Plan R 4, the transport of
troops to Trondheim and Narvik to aid the Norwegians if attacked by
Germany. The Allies did not believe that it would be possible for the
Germans to land forces in northern Norway at the onset of a campaign, thus
they would have sufficient time to load forces and material in Britain,
transport and land them in Norway, and organize a defense before the North
was threatened by German forces.
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3. German Military Considerations
It can be seen that the Germans were justifiably concerned about
Allied actions in Scandinavia. The service High Commands, however,
generally did not consider a Scandinavian offensive feasible, and preferred to
rely on the high probability of the Allies' honoring Scandinavian neutrality.
In a conference with the commanders in chief and chiefs of staff of
the three services on 27 September 1939, Hitler disclosed his intention to
launch an attack on the west as early as possible in 1939. (Greiner, 1979, p. 1)
Most resistance in Poland had ceased on that date. His plan was delineated in
"Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War" dated 9 October 1939. If England
and France were not willing to make peace, then Germany must "act
vigorously and aggressively without delay." (Department of State, 1954, p. 248)
Preparations were to begin immediately for an attack into Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Holland "with as much strength and as early a date as possible."
(Department of State, 1954, p. 249) The objective was to "defeat as strong a part
of the French operational army as possible, as well as the allies fighting by its
side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as possible in Holland,
Belgium, and Northern France. . ." (Department of State, 1954, p. 249) The
occupied territory was to serve two purposes: first as a base for an air and sea
war against Britain, and second as a buffer zone for the Ruhr industrial area.
(Department of State, 1954, p. 249)
The Army High Command (OKH) concerned itself with devising a
plan which would accomplish this objective without the attack degenerating
into the stalemate of 1914. A plan was readied and on 10 January 1940 Hitler
decided to commence the attack on 17 January. The plan was compromised
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when a copy of the plan was recovered from a German Air Force plane that
had been forced to land in Belgium; this incident, combined with the onset of
bad weather, led to the cancellation of the venture on 13 January. This gave
the OKH the opportunity to devise "Plan Yellow" to be executed in the spring.
(Mearshimer, 1983, Ch. 4) The air force, assigned a strategic role in Directive
No. 6, was equipped primarily to provide tactical air support to the army.
Both the army and air force, therefore, emphasized preparations for an
offensive on the western front.
Admiral Raeder, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, was not
satisfied with the land attack strategy. Assigned responsibility for conducting
a sea war against Britain at the conclusion of the campaign, he did not think
that the bases that would be gained on the Belgian coast would be adequate for
the task. He perceived that the German navy would find itself confined to
the North Sea by the British navy as in 1914-1918. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 300)
Raeder discussed the strategic significance of Norway with Hitler in the
prosecution of a sea war against Britain on 10 October 1939. (Admiralty, 1948,
p. 1) Earlier that month, Raeder and the Naval Staff concluded that
Trondheim and Narvik were the best locations for bases, but that neither the
navy would be strong enough to use them effectively, nor the army strong
enough to defend them, given its continental commitments. An additional
consideration was that, "(Although). . . the occupation of Norwegian bases
would extend the operational base for German naval and air forces activity
against England. . . (the). . . Naval Staff was nevertheless aware that the
strategic value of this extension must not be over-rated. The centre of gravity
of German naval warfare on England was the Atlantic; Norway was far from
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the Atlantic and separated from it by the patrol lines Scotland-Iceland and
Greenland, which was easily watched by the English." (Admiralty, 1948, p. 1)
Another possible consequence of German inaction during a British
occupation of Norway would be a large infusion of Allied forces into
Scandinavia. Hitler was concerned that this would undermine the security of
Germany's Baltic flank. (Ziemke in Command Decisions,1959, p. 57)
The navy appreciated the importance of Norway, but believed it
beyond their grasp. The conclusion reached by the Naval Staff was that
Norwegian neutrality must be promoted; if such actions were unsuccessful,
then Norway must be denied to the British.
C DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
1. Initial Planning
Despite the strong arguments against German military action in
Scandinavia, Hitler became concerned in January 1940 about the possibility of
British intervention in Norway as a result of the Russo-Finnish War. Raeder
had continued to warn him of the consequences of British presence in
Norway. Hitler ordered the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) to
conduct an investigation entitled Studie Nord which considered an operation
in Norway, based on the premise that Germany could not allow the British to
control any part of Scandinavia.
Each service was required to submit opinions of the study; the Naval
Staff had two important findings. First, surprise would be an essential
element for a successful Norwegian operation. Second, if naval combatants
were utilized as fast transports for army units, then a number of important
Norwegian ports could be occupied simultaneously. (Ziemke in Command
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Decisions, 1959, pp, 48-49) Both of these aspects would be incorporated into
the final plan, and would contribute to the ultimate victory. It would work to
minimize Norwegian resistance and foil British assistance.
The Air Force was initially tasked to develop an operational plan
based on the study, and when the offense in the west was postponed until the
spring, Hitler decided that the Norwegian operation required increased
attention. All further work on the plan was to be done by a special working
staff within OKW. The working staff was formed on 5 February 1940 as a
section of the OKW Operations Staff. Captain Theodor Krancke of the navy
was the senior officer assigned. (Ziemke in Command Decisions, 1959, pp. 49-
50)
In three weeks, Krancke and his staff developed a detailed operational
plan which identified the principal objectives of the offensive. Simultaneous
landings were to occur at Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Stavanger, Bergen,
Trondheim, and Narvik. The assault waves were to be transported primarily
by aircraft and partly by ship. The objectives selected included the major
centers of population, and therefore the mobilization base of the Norwegian
Army. Once the population and weapon arsenals were under German
control, any internal resistance would be ineffective. (Ziemke in Command
Decisions, 1959, pp. 50-51) Detailed intelligence regarding the Norwegian coast
defenses, hydrographic characteristics of the landing sites, and specific terrain
were difficult to obtain. Additionally, all preparations were carried out in
great secrecy compounding the problem of acquiring information.
Command of the forces was assigned to Lieutenant General Nikolaus
von Falkenhorst, Commanding General, XXI Corps. Under his direction,
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planning for the Norwegian operation continued using the Krancke Plan as
the basis.
Continued planning resulted in two major departures from the
original concept. The first departure was the inclusion of an occupation of
Denmark. Studie Nord had indicated that air and naval bases on the tip of
the Jutland peninsula would facilitate control of the Danish Straits. Also, the
ability to refuel transport aircraft in Denmark, rather than in Germany, would
extend the potential range of the aircraft within Norway. The original
intention was to acquire basing rights from Denmark through diplomatic
channels. It was decided that such an important matter, upon which the
success of the operation might depend, could not be left to chance. A plan to
occupy Denmark was presented to the OKW Chief of Staff by von Falkenhorst
and was accepted.
The second departure concerned the relationship of operations in
Norway with intended operations in the west. The Krancke Plan had been
based on the assumption that the Norwegian operation would occur either
before or after the western offensive. Hitler approved the request by the
OKW Operations Officer, General Jodl, that both campaigns be planned so as
to be independent of one another. A major revision to the planning was
required: the number of paratroop units was reduced to four companies
rather than a division.
2. The Directive
The "Directive for 'Fall Weseruebung'" was issued by the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces on 1 March 1940. It began by stating that,
"The development of the Situation in Scandinavia required the making of all
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preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the
German Armed Forces." (Longsum, 1958, p. 33) There were three objectives of
the operation: "prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the
Baltic"; "Guarantee our ore base in Sweden"; and "give our Navy and Air
Force a wider start line against Britain." (Longsum, 1958, p. 33) The role of the
Navy and Air Force in the operation were specifically mentioned, namely "to
protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking
forces." (Longsum, 1958, p. 33)
Two concepts were next mentioned in the directive. First, as a result
of the disparity between the political-military power of Germany and the
Scandinavian States, the forces employed would be as small as possible. This
would lead to numerical weakness which was to be "balanced by our daring
actions and surprise execution." (Longsum, 1958, p. 33) Second, the operation
was to appear as a peaceful occupation to protect the neutrality of
Scandinavian States. "Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the
Governments at the beginning of the occupation." (Longsum, 1958, p. 33)
The command relationships between the forces participating in the
operation were then explained in the directive. General von Falkenhorst was
to command "Group XXI" and be responsible for the preparation and conduct
of the operation. He was to serve directly under the orders of Hitler. All
forces selected to participate in the operation were under separate command
and were not to be allocated to any other operational theaters. Air Force units
specifically assigned to the operation were under the tactical control of Group
XXI, then were to revert back to the control of the Commander in Chief of the
Air Force. A most significant passage concerning joint service command
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relationships stated that, "The employment of the forces which are under
direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the
Commander of Group XXI." (Longsum, 1958, p. 34)
The directive continues with the mission of the assigned forces. The
movement into Denmark and the landings in Norway were to take place
simultaneously. The operation was to be prepared as quickly as possible, so
that if Allies seized the initiative, the Germans would be able to counterattack
immediately. The importance of surprise was again stressed in regards to
both the Scandinavian States and the Western opponents. Secrecy was
required for all preparations. (Longsum, 1958, p. 34)
The last part of the directive served to split the operation into two
parts: the occupation of Denmark (Weseruebung Sued) and the occupation of
Norway (Weseruebung Nord). A number of geographic objectives and
general tasks were assigned to the forces allocated to each operation.
(Longsum, 1958, p. 35) Finally, two code names were assigned: "Wesertag"
was to be the day of the operation (W-Day) and "Weserzeit" was to be the
hour of the operation (W-Hour). (Longsum, 1958, p. 35)
3. Continued Planning
Political planning had to parallel the military preparations for Fall
Weseruebung. The National Defense Branch of the Operations Staff of OKW
prepared the documents that were to be presented to the respective
governments. The German civilian foreign service representatives were
notified just previous to W-Day in order to preserve secrecy. The foreign
service officials then presented the German demands to the governments of
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Norway and Denmark fifteen minutes prior to W-Hour. (Ziemke, German
Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 38-39)
One result of this directive with the German military was to make
detailed planning difficult for the operational units. The plans had to be
closely held and troops could not be briefed as to their objectives. There were
four possible political conditions which operational plans had to take into
account: "'Denmark and Norway: no resistance'; 'Denmark and Norway:
resistance'; Denmark: no resistance/Norway: resistance'; and 'Denmark:
resistance/Norway: no resistance'." (Morzik, 1961, p. 94) This was especially
critical for the Air Force transport command; navigational plans and
refueling schedules as well as the logistic support required by ground troops
and levels of reinforcement could vary considerably depending upon the
contingency. The solution was to prepare four separate and complete
operation orders.
Command relationships between Group XXI and air force units as
organized in the directive were altered after the OKL protested: the Air Force
would retain tactical control and command of its units. Group XXI was to
command only the six divisions allocated to the ground forces, supported by
air force and navy units. The OKL and OKM conducted coordinated
independent planning with Group XXI, assigning operational control of air
force and naval units to separate commands. (Ziemke, German Northern
Theater, 1959, p. 30)
Generaleutenant Hans Griesler commanded the X Air Corps, to
which all air units were assigned. The X Air Corps consisted of a cadre of two
bomber wings; for Fall Weseruebung, a reconnaissance squadron, two
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additional bomber wings, one twin engine fighter wing, one fighter group,
one coast reconnaissance and naval support group, four special transport
wings, and one seaplane transport group were attached. (Ziemke, German
Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 5-6) Airborne, parachute, and logistic operations
were to be planned and conducted by two subordinate commands, Chief of
Air Transport (Land) and Chief of Air Transport (Sea). (Morzik, 1961, p. 36)
Naval units were under the control of either Naval Group West, if in
the North Sea and off Norway, or Naval Group East, if in the Baltic or Danish
Straits. Command relationships were further altered when XXXI Corps,
under General Leonhard Kaupisch of the Air Force, was directed to plan and
direct operations in Denmark. XXXI Corps was to be subordinate to Group
XXI until W plus 3 days, then revert to OKH control. (Ziemke, German
Northern Theater, p. 30-31)
D. THE PLAN
The plan and the conduct of Fall Weseruebung was shaped by the terrain
of Norway and Denmark. Most of the Norwegian population lived along the
coast in the larger towns and cities. The interior of the country is
mountainous, and had sparse rail and road communications. From Oslo, in
southern Norway, two narrow river valleys cut north towards Trondheim
and the coast of central Norway: the Gudbrandsdal and the Osterdal. The
easiest access to the northern part of Norway was by sea.
The terrain of Denmark was ideal for a rapid movement over land from
the German border to seize the Jutland peninsula. Copenhagen and other
strategic points were on islands and had to be taken by attacks of combined
forces transported by sea and air.
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1. Scheme of Maneuver
The units allocated to Weseruebung Nord had the following
assignments (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 33-35):
139th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division: On W-Day, this unit
was to debark from Assault Group 1 in Narvik and take control of the town.
As soon as possible, forces were to move inland and up to the Swedish border
to control the ore railline from Sweden. The 138th Regiment of the 3rd
Mountain Division, when released from conducting operations in the
Trondheim area, was to reinforce the units holding the Narvik sector.
138th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division: On W-Day, this unit
was to debark from Assault Group 2 in Trondheim and take control of the
immediate area. Beginning on W plus 7 days, elements of the 196th Infantry
Division proceeding overland from Oslo were to relieve the 138th Regiment
in Trondheim. Upon relief, the unit was to proceed to Narvik when
transport was available.
69th Infantry Division: On W-Day, two battalions were to debark
from Assault Group 3 at Bergen; two battalions were to land at Stavanger by
air transport; the Division bicycle troop was to debark from Assault Group 6 at
Egersund. On W plus 1 day, three battalions were to reinforce Stavanger by
air. On W plus 1 and W plus 2 days, the remainder of the Division was to
debark at Oslo and proceed overland by rail to Bergen, passing through the
163rd and 196th Divisions in the vicinity of Oslo. The elements in Stavanger
were to be relieved by elements of the 214th Division. Until the operation is
completed, the Division was to occupy the zone from Nordfiord to Egersund.
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163rd Infantry Division: On W-Day, one battalion was to debark from
Assault Group 4 at Kristiansand (to be reinforced at approximately W plus 7
hours by two battalions); the Division bicycle troop was to debark from
Assault Group 4 at Arendal; two battalions were to debark from Assault
Group 5 at Oslo; and two battalions were to conduct an air assault of Fornebu
Airfield (in the vicinity of Oslo). As the situation was to develop, elements of
this Division were to gain control of Oslo, the zone to the West of Oslo Fiord,
and the zone to the North of Oslo in the vicinity of Lillestrom.
196th Infantry Division: This unit was to debark at Oslo on W plus 2
days. It was to pass through the 163rd Division; two regiments were to take
the zone to the north of Oslo in the vicinity of Lillehammer, while the other
regiment was to proceed to Andalsnes via railroad as soon as possible. The
remainder of the Division was to be relieved on W plus 7 days by elements of
the 181st Division, and then move to the north to occupy the zone from
Trondheim to Mosjoen to Andalsnes, relieving the 138th Regiment, 3rd
Mountain Division in Trondheim.
181st Infantry Division: This unit was to debark at Oslo on W plus 6
days. The Division was to secure the zone to the east of Oslo up to the
Swedish border. One regiment was to relieve elements of 163rd Division in
the vicinity of Lillestrom, and one regiment was to relieve units of 196th
Division in the vicinity of Lillehammer.
214th Infantry Division: This unit was to debark at Oslo on W plus 8
days. The Division was to proceed to Stavanger and Kristainsand to relieve
elements of the 69th and 163rd Divisions. Until completion of the operation,
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it was to provide security for the southwest coast in a zone from Stavanger to
Arendal.
The units allocated to Weseruebung Sued had the following
assignments (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 35-36):
170th Infantry Division: On W-Day, one regiment (motorized) was to
protect the left flank of the 11th Motorized Brigade in its advance to capture
the airfields at Aalborg. Three reinforced companies were to debark from
Assault Group 9 and capture the bridge at Middlefart, then proceed to Nyborg.
The remainder of the Division was to secure the Danish mainland, reaching
Skagen and Fredaikshaven no later than W plus 2 days.
11th Motorized Brigade: On W-Day, this unit was to advance to
Aalborg to support the air assault battalion holding the airfields.
198th Infantry Division: On W-Day, one reinforced battalion was to
debark from Assault Group 7, one company was to land at Nyborg to capture
the crossing of the Great Belt, the remainder were to land at Korsor to proceed
overland to Copenhagen; one battalion was to proceed by ferry and armored
train along the route Warnemuende to Gedser to Copenhagen, passing
through the parachute company (minus) holding the bridge at Vordingborg.
2. Supporting Forces
Given the operational objectives and the terrain features of the
theater, in this campaign the success or failure rested with the ability of the
ground forces to occupy and then defend Norway. The navy and the air force
supported the ground force scheme of maneuver through direct and indirect
combat support and through transportation of both assault and follow-on
forces and of logistics support.
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a. Naval Forces
Given the numerical strength of the British navy, the German
navy could not successfully wage a naval campaign to gain sea control prior
to assault operations, as is the doctrine used by maritime powers. Therefore,
the opportunities for the German navy to provide direct combat support were
limited. The German navy's indirect combat support of Fall Weseruebung
was in three parts. First, attain temporary local "sea control" through a
combination of deception, speed of movement, and decoy operations.
Second, use U-Boats and land-based aircraft to deny the British absolute
freedom of the seas. Third, protect the sea lines of communications leading
from the German sea ports on the Baltic coast through the Danish Straits to
Oslo.
Both surface ships and submarines conducted indirect support
during the campaign. Two battleships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau,
after escorting two assault transport groups, attempted to decoy elements of
the British fleet by posing as commerce raiders breaking-out into the Atlantic.
Operation Harmut was the plan to protect the surface ships and beachheads
during Fall Weseruebung from British naval attacks with twenty-eight U-
Boats. They were in position by W minus 2 days in the following positions:
five off Narvik, two off Trondheim, three off Bergen, two off Stavanger, three
north-east of the Shetland Islands, four south-west of the Shetland Islands,
four in Pentland Firth, and three in the eastern sector of the English Channel.
(Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, p. 30; Butler, 1957, p. 9)
Military planners allocate adequate transport and logistic support
to the appropriate forces needed to implement the operational plan. As
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Norway was in a maritime theater in relation to Germany, planners for Fall
Weseruebung had to calculate air lift and sea lift requirements for both the
assault forces and follow-on forces. The number of combat forces required to
defeat enemy opposition and attain operational objectives had to be balanced
with the capabilities and capacities of available transport over a period of
time. Developing a time line to match the scheme of maneuver with lift
requirements for assault and follow-on forces unified seemingly different
aspects of the campaign.
One method to construct a time line is to search for the type of
unit with the "lowest common denominator" in the time and distance
relationship. When projecting power into a maritime theater, the slowest
forces will move by sea; and for Fall Weseruebung, the farthest distance from
Germany to an objective was to Narvik. Transport aircraft, the fastest means
of transport, did not have the required unrefueled range to reach Narvik. In
order to minimize exposure of assault transports, and still meet the
requirement for a simultaneous landing, combatant ships were to be used as
assault transports. However, they were limited in capacity, so slower
transport ships carrying heavy equipment, munitions, and provisions were
staged near the farthest objectives. These ships were to leave Germany no
earlier than W minus 6 days so that secrecy could be preserved for as long as
possible. (Admiralty, 1948, pp. 12-13)
One group of seven ships was organized into the Export Echelon
and distributed as follows: three to Narvik, three to Trondheim, and one to
Stavanger. (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, p. 28) The problem of
refueling the combatants being used as assault transports for the return trip to
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their home ports and of meeting the fuel requirements for the occupation
forces was to be solved by the Tanker Echelon. This was a group of eight ships
distributed as follows: two to Narvik, one to Trondheim (both to reach their
destinations prior to W Day), and the remainder were assigned to Oslo,
Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand (all to reach their destinations on W
day). (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 28-29)
The greatest amount of tonnage required to build up combat
power in Norway was carried in eight Sea Transport Echelons. On W day, the
1st sea Transport Echelon of fifteen ships would reach Oslo, Kristiansand,
Bergen, and Stavanger. The seven remaining Sea Transport Echelons had the
destination of Oslo on the following schedule: W plus 2 days for the 2nd Sea
Transport Echelon of eleven ships; W plus 6 days for the 3rd Sea Transport
Echelon of thirteen ships; and between W plus 8 and W plus 12 days the 4th
through 8th Sea Transport Echelons, using returned ships from the previous
three units. (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, p. 29)
For the Weseruebung Nord assault operations, the naval units
participating were organized and assigned missions as follows (Admiralty,
1948, pp. 10-11; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 27-28):
Assault Group 1 consisting of ten destroyers: The 138th Regiment
of the 3rd Mountain Division was to be embarked for transport to Narvik.
The Group was to proceed in company with the battleships Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau and Assault Group 2 until it reached the vicinity of Trondheim,
and then it was to proceed independently to Narvik.
Assault Group 2 consisting of the cruiser Hipper and four
destroyers: The 139th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division was to be
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embarked for transport to Trondheim. The Group was to proceed in
company with the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and Assault Group
1 until it reached the vicinity of Trondheim, and then it was to detach; it was
then to maneuver to seaward until the time came to make the final approach
to Trondheim to meet W-Hour.
Assault Group 3 consisting of the cruisers Koeln and Koengsberg,
the auxiliaries Bremse and Karl Peters, three torpedo boats, and five motor
torpedo boats: One battalion of the 69th division was to be embarked for
transport to Bergen.
Assault Group 4 consisting of the cruiser Karlsruhe, the auxiliary
Tsingtau, three torpedo boats, and seven motor torpedo boats: One battalion
and the bicycle squadron of the 163rd Division was to be embarked for
transport to Kristiansand and Arendal.
Assault Group 5 consisting of the cruisers Bluecher, Luetzow, and
Emden, three torpedo boats, two armed whaling boats, and eight
minesweepers: Two battalions of the 163rd Division were to be embarked for
transport to Oslo.
Assault Group 6 consisting of four minesweepers: The bicycle
squadron of the 69th Division was to be embarked for transport to Egersund.
For the Weseruebung Sued assault operations, the naval units
participating were organized and assigned missions as follows (Admiralty,
1948, pp. 10-11; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 27-28).
Assault Group 7 consisting of the battleship Schleswig-Holstien
and various auxiliaries: A reinforced battalion of the 198th Division was to
embark at Kiel for transport to Nyborg and Korsor.
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Assault Group 8 consisting of the steamer Hansestadt Danzig and
two patrol vessels: One battalion of the 198th division was to embark at Kiel
for transport to Copenhagen.
Assault Group 9 consisting of the minelayer Rugard and various
small craft: Three reinforced companies of the 170th Division were to embark
at Kiel for transport to Middlefart.
Assault Group 10 consisting of light naval forces from Cuxhaven:
This Group was to secure Thyboron from seaward and meet elements of the
170th Division advancing overland.
Assault Group 11 consisting of light naval forces from Cuxhaven:
This Group was to secure Esberg from seaward and meet elements of the
170th Division advancing overland.
b. Air Forces
The air strategy provided both direct and indirect combat support
to ground and naval units by conducting close air support, interdiction, and
demonstration missions. Assignments for X Air Corps bomber and fighter
forces were as follows (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 36-38):
Bombers: The main bomber force was to be held as a ready
reserve to combat the British navy if it sortied. One bomber squadron was to
deploy to the Stavanger airfield on W-Day to interdict any attempt by the
British navy to attack the beachheads on the west coast of Norway. One
bomber squadron was to deploy to Fornebu Airfield, in the vicinity of Oslo,
when that location was secured; it was to provide ground support during the
remainder of the campaign. One bomber group was to provide ground
support for the advance into Jutland. Three bomber groups were to conduct
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demonstrations at the following locations: Oslo, the Kristiansand-Bergen
sector, and Copenhagen.
Fighters: One group (less 15 planes) was to support the airborne
assault at Aalborg; once that location was secured, it was to operate to protect
air transports between Aalborg, stavanger, and Oslo. Three flights of five
planes each were to support landings at Oslo, Stavanger, and Copenhagen;
upon completion, the Oslo and Stavanger flights were to remain at that
location to conduct further operations, and the Copenhagen flight was to
operate from Aalborg.
The two types of assault troops that the air force moved in the
early hours of the campaign were parachute troops and airborne troops. The
paratroops for Weseruebung Nord were assigned the following mission: On
W-Day, two companies were to land at Fornebu airfield, in the vicinity of
Oslo, to secure an airhead for the follow-on landing of two air assault
battalions from the 163rd Division. (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959,
pp. 33-34) The paratroops for Weseruebung Sued were assigned the following
mission : On W-Day at W plus 2 hours, one platoon was to land at the
Aalborg airfields to secure them for the landing of a follow-on air assault
battalion; and one company (minus) was to secure the bridge at Vordingborg
to open the route for elements of the 198th Division advancing to
Copenhagen. (Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, pp. 35-36)
Air Transport command (Land), in addition to providing air lift
for assault operations, was assigned a crucial role in meeting requirements for
timely reinforcement and resupply at both critical points and at distant
objectives after the initial assault. Once bases were established on Norwegian
66
territory, German transports had sufficient range to cover the entire country.
The enemy anti-air threat was assessed to be negligible, so that the German air
force was expected to gain control of the air over Norway early in the
campaign.
E CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN
A number of incidents, such as the actions of the HMS Cossack during the
Altmark affair, convinced Hitler that a British invasion of Norway was
imminent and that he had to preempt it. On 1 April, after a thorough review
of the plan for Fall Weseruebung, he designated 9 April as W-Day, and 0515
hours as W-Hour.
The Danish government capitulated to Germany's demands, and
Denmark was occupied as planned on W-Day. The King of Denmark was
prevented from leaving the country, so the Germans were able to obtain an
agreement from the legitimate leader of the Danish government to capitulate.
Negotiations to demobilize the Danish armed forces began on 9 April.
(Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 1959, p. 62)
In Norway, the isolation of the political center of the country was not
effective: the King was able to evade capture and the Commander in Chief of
the Norwegian Army began to organize resistance north of Oslo in the
approaches to the Gudbrandsdal and the Osterdal. Effective Norwegian
resistance was centered in two areas. In the north, the 6th Norwegian
Division was near full strength guarding the border with the Soviet Union.
Although the 138th Regiment was able to occupy Narvik, the Norwegians
were able to hinder the German advance inland. In the south, the landing
was not a success. The company of paratroopers for the Fornebu Airfield
67
turned back due to weather, and the air assault battalions alone had to
contend with the Norwegian anti-aircraft defenses. Eventually the Germans
captured the airfield, but at a high loss and at the further cost of reduced
capacity of the airfield due to wreckage. Combat power did not build up as
rapidly as planned through the Oslo airhead. The troops landing by sea at
Oslo also suffered losses when coastal gun and torpedo batteries sunk the
Bluecher; in addition to losing the ship and much of the crew, the Germans
lost much of a battalion of infantry and divisional staff. The surface-borne
assault troops were prevented from landing at Oslo until W plus 1 day.
Overall, the bold German action gained them the initiative. Despite a few
miscues at Kristiansand and Oslo, the initial objectives of the campaign were
met. At 1824 hours on 9 April, German Naval Group West reported that
Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, and Arendal had been
occupied, and that airborne troops were in the process of occupying Oslo, but
that the Norwegian government had been evacuated. (Admiralty, 1948, p. 25)
Commander, Group XXI had to deal with both the slow start at Oslo and the
activities of the British fleet in the north.
The German covering force of battleships had successfully diverted the
attention of the British away from Assault Group 1 and 2 and they were able
to land the embarked troops. The destroyers at Narvik found that only one of
the tankers had made it to port; this complicated the refueling process prior to
the return trip to Germany. An additional complication was the five British
destroyers that had been patrolling off the northern coast of Norway and
which were ordered to investigate the situation at Narvik. On 10 April they
surprised five of the ten German destroyers that had been refueling in Narvik
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harbor. Those five German ships were all sunk or damaged at the cost of two
British ships sunk. The German ships that were ready for sea attempted to
leave Narvik on the night of 11 April, but found the mouth of the fiord
heavily guarded by British ships. On 13 April, a British cruiser escorted by
nine destroyers entered the fiord and destroyed the remainder of the German
ships at Narvik.
The battleships and part of Assault Group 2 from Trondheim began a
successful trip home on 11 April, joined on 12 April by part of Assault Group
3 from Bergen. The cost to the German navy of surface ships was high: one
heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers sunk, as well as other
ships damaged. Additionally, German submarines were not as effective as
expected due to malfunctions of their torpedoes. The burden of protecting the
German beachheads fell upon the air force.
Given the success of the Royal Navy in isolating the German forces at
Narvik, which was not under the umbrella of protection offered by the air
force, a major expedition by the Allies was sent to capture Narvik. These
forces were greatly superior to the Germans, but the commanders lacked
energy and failed to exploit their advantage. They eventually did capture
Narvik, but they were withdrawn on 3 June due to an advancing German
column from the south and due to the impact of Allied reverses in the Battle
of France.
By W plus 2, days German operations were mainly centered in four
locations: in the south around Oslo, in the southwest in the
Bergen/Stavanger sector, on the central coast at Trondheim, and in the north
at Narvik. Scheduled reinforcements began to arrive on time; the original
69
plan directed these units to advance to Trondheim and Bergen by rail.
However, given the developing Norwegian resistance, Group XXI retained
them in the vicinity of Oslo in order to secure a base for further operations.
During W plus 4 to 5 days, units attached to the 196th Division captured
the zone to the southeast of Oslo, up to the Swedish border, and the zone to
the northeast of Oslo (originally the responsibility of the 181st Division), so
that forces were in position to advance to the approaches leading into the
Osterdal. The 163rd Division operated along the railline to Kristiansand,
along the railline to Bergen, and to the north of Oslo to secure the approaches
into the Gudrandsdal. One regiment of the 181st arrived at Oslo. It was
attached to the 163rd Division on W plus 5 days to reinforce the advance into
the Gudbrandsdal. Moderate resistance to the activities of both divisions was
provided by the 1st and 2nd Norwegian Divisions.
The Allied reaction to the German invasion of Norway in part consisted
of landings at Namsos and Andalsnes between 14 to 19 April, with the intent
of recapturing Trondheim with a pincer movement. These allied troops were
ill-supported by artillery and air cover, and the southern unit was diverted
into the Gudbrandsdal to assist Norwegian forces. Although both of these
forces were eventually defeated by the Germans, they did delay the Germans
from consolidating their hold on Norway. In reaction to the threat posed by
the allied landings, the OKW ordered elements of the 181st Division to be
airlifted into Trondheim on W plus 6 days. The 196th Division, which
according to the original plan was to relieve the 138th Regiment, was
detained by fighting in the vicinity of Oslo. The elements of the 181st sent to
Trondheim reinforced the 138th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division and
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formed Group Trondheim. The most immediate threat to Trondheim was
from the north.
On W plus 8 days, the point of main effort of both the 163rd and the 196th
Divisions was to the north. The 196th was to the east advancing towards the
Osterdal. The 163rd, with attached units from the 69th, 181st, and 196th
Divisions, was advancing towards the Gudbrandsdal. Both divisions were
meeting heavy resistance, as the Norwegians were making good use of the
terrain to aid the defense.
At Stavanger on W plus 8 days, an airlift of the 214th Division began. It
replaced the units of the 69th Division that were then airlifted into Bergen.
As the 214th Division gained strength, it began offensive operations to secure
the southwest coast of Norway, where it faced light opposition. By W plus 12
days, it had opened communications overland from Oslo.
The advance to the north by the 163rd and 196th Divisions continued. On
W plus 12 days, the 163rd was ordered to shift its point of main effort to the
west. This was to protect the flank of the 196th as it continued north from
threats of a landing by the Allies on the coast between Bergen and Andalsnes.
The 163rd detached the regiment from the 181st Division, which was then
attached to the 196th Division. The 196th took command of the advancing
columns in both the Gudbrandsdal and the Osterdal.
On W plus 14 days, the 163rd began its attack to the west in two columns.
One was along the Oslo-Bergaen railline, and the other was to the northwest
toward the coast.The advance of the 163rd Division towards Bergen became
stalled near the town of Bagn by fortifications and a demolished tunnel. A
series of attacks by dive bombers allowed the Germans to break through; they
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met advance elements of the 69th Division in the vicinity of Myrdal on W
plus 23 days. The conquest of South Norway was complete.
On W plus 15 days, the column of the 196th Division advancing into the
Gudbrandsdal defeated a large force of British and Norwegian defenders
which were forced to retreat. The commander of the 196th believed that the
column in the Osterdal was strong enough to continue the advance alone to
Trondheim. He directed the column operating in the Gudbrandsdal to detach
the regiment from the 181st so it would continue to Trondheim, as the 181st
was now centered there. The remainder of that force was to pursue the
British force retreating westward back to its beachhead at Andalsnes. The
British were able to out-distance the Germans, and evacuated before advanced
elements of the German forces reached Andalsnes on W plus 23 days.
In Central Norway, Group Trondheim had stopped the advance of the
Allied troops that landed at Namsos on W plus 15 days at the town of
Steinkjer. Some activity by Group Trondheim was begun on W plus 16 days
to the south so that communications could be opened with Oslo. The forces
attacking to the south met advance elements of the 196th division on W plus
21 days at Berkaak. In the north, Group Trondheim continued to pressure the
allied forces, and reached Namsos on W plus 25 days, after the allies had
evacuated.
To continue the momentum of the advance to the north toward Narvik,
units of the 2nd Mountain Division were attached to Group XXI and airlifted
to Trondheim from Germany. Overland communication to Narvik were
nonexistent, the route was broken by high mountains and fiords. The 2nd
Mountain Division began the advance on W plus 26 days, reaching Mosjoen
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on W plus 32 days. The British attempted to slow the advance by landing
small forces along the route of advance, but were generally unsuccessful. By
W plus 54 days, the 2nd Mountain Division had reached Sorfad. A hand-
picked unit was assembled from the division to make the final push through
the mountains into Narvik. This effort proved unnecessary, as the allies had
withdrawn their forces on W plus 60 days, and the 139th Regiment
immediately reoccupied the town. The 138th Regiment of the 3rd Mountain
Division was transported by ship into Narvik to relieve the 139th Regiment.
F. ANALYSIS
Fall Weseruebung worked because the Germans appreciated the
importance of surprise and daring in a military operation against unfavorable
odds. Additionally, the Germans overcame the limitations of their forces
through the innovative employment of joint forces in a maritime theater.
For example, they were the first to combine aircraft and infantry in paratroop
and air assault operations, they made extensive use of aircraft for both combat
support and logistic support, and they used the speed advantage of surface
combatant ships to move assault elements through an area of the ocean
under the strategic control of the enemy. The following analysis will show
the influence of German joint service organization and considerations of the
theater of operations on the operation plan and conduct of the campaign.
The German armed forces were unified under OKW command in
principle, but not in practice. The OKW was intended to provide unified
administrative and strategic guidance at its inception, but the high command
was subsequently weakened by the organizational changes of 1938 and by the
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inter-service rivalry in the defense ministry of the government over
allocation of resources.
Despite this situation, the German Norwegian campaign was a successful
joint service operation. The cause was not due to an explicit joint doctrine
able to provide procedures for joint planning and operations. However, it
may be found in the traditional dominance of the army and the German
General Staff among the armed forces, which may have indirectly contributed
to the ability to conduct a joint operation and precluded any inter-service
debate about joint doctrine. If the both navy and air force not only
subordinated its operations to the army, but also modeled its planning and
operational procedures on the General Staff, then the result would create an
automatic condition of inter-service coordination.
Another source of German joint service competence may have been the
professionalism that existed among the officer corps. The mid-level officers
responsible for the planning and conduct of the campaign may have had an
operational perspective which led to cooperation in order to achieve a higher
objective, rather than to the promotion of their own interests.
The German leadership at the strategic level were unhindered by many of
the domestic political conflicts which existed in Britain in 1915. They were
able to use the maritime theater as a tool to allocate forces and organize
operations to math strategic ends and means. As a result, the plan was based
on a consideration of the requirements of the campaign to meet an objective,
and eliminated many of the uncertainties which plagued the British theater
commanders in the Turkish campaign of 1915.
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The German plan was successful in overcoming two problems: the
requirement to avoid a prolonged campaign and the inability to move a
sufficient number of ground forces into a maritime theater. The first
requirement was exacerbated by the location of Narvik in the far north of
Norway; Narvik had to be occupied to secure the transportation facilities for
iron ore. One approach would have been a series of limited sequential
operations beginning in the south and proceeding along the coast; however,
this would have presented the enemy with the opportunity to reinforce
North Norway and prolong the campaign. The solution was a concentric
assault at key points throughout the country, followed by a rapid
reinforcement of each bridgehead. During the last phases of the planned
campaign, the bridgeheads would be consolidated by forces moving into
Norway from the south and into the interior.
Movement of the forces into the theater presented another problem. It
was the use of both sea and air transport which provided sufficient capacity
for the required forces. The portion of this movement over the water might
have been interdicted by the Royal Navy, but a combination of surprise and
deception, and the use of fast combatant ships rather than slower transports,
gave the Germans sufficient sea "control" to move the assault force. The
German ability to organize both their forces and the operation to exploit the
capabilities of joint forces was a major reason for the success of the campaign.
This campaign was a demonstration of how detailed planning can
interrelate with flexible execution to achieve the objectives of the campaign.
The Germans used their operational plans as a tool to integrate the actions of
combat forces and support forces within the theater and to communicate the
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intent of the operation. Once combat began, the plans served as a basis for
change, allowing the forces engaged to respond to both opportunities and
crises. When enemy resistance prevented the situation from developing as
expected, Group XXI made changes in the planned scheme of maneuver.
Although major units were diverted from their intended operations areas,
confusion was minimal and logistics support was made available. This
impressive flexibility allowed the Germans to maintain the initiative
throughout the campaign.
The daring and surprise, which secured the initiative in the theater for
the Germans, was the key element of this campaign and it was the reason for
the success of the Norwegian campaign. The desire to achieve the same
result, securing the initiative in the theater, led to a similarly bold campaign
conducted by the United States during the Korean War.
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IV. THE U.S. CAMPAIGN IN KOREA (INCHON), 1950
In the strategic literature of the Cold War, the Korean War stands as a
prime example of the challenges of combat in "limited war." The limits of
war, however, depend on a nation's strategic calculus and national interests
at stake. Within this context, the Inchon landing and United Nations
offensive in the Fall of 1950 holds an uncertain position for analysis. One
could be dismiss the episode as a futile waste, just as the war could be
dismissed as an aberration. The Korean War could also be studied, within the
context of a limited war, to gain an appreciation of political and military
decision-making. If one sees violence as a normal, though unfortunate, part
of political intercourse between nations, then wars which limit the ends or
means of violence deserve as close a scrutiny as wars involving
intercontinental nuclear weapons.
From the perspective of the United States, the intervention in Korea
turned a regional war between North Korean and South Korea into a limited
war. The war was fought to gain a number of limited objectives, which
included the survival of South Korea, the deterrence of the Soviet Union,
and the enhancement of the credibility of European allies. The larger global
interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union prevented the war
from approaching war's inherent full extremes of violence, or absolute war.
Within the limits established on the scope of violence, the Inchon landing
took place within the framework of an operational military doctrine for
amphibious warfare, the development of which had been initiated in the
1930s and perfected in the 1940s. General Douglas MacArthur, depending
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upon the technical expertise of veterans of the Second World War and the
institutional memory of the United States armed forces, conducted an
operation which reversed the fortunes of war for the North Korean
aggressors. To achieve this success, MacArthur depended on control of the
sea and air, which led to his eventual success on land, within a maritime
theater.
Further offensive military action into North Korean territory led to
failure two months later when the Chinese intervened. This chapter focuses
on the successful aspects of U.S. and U.N. actions in Korea in 1950, but the
unsuccessful aspects exist as a reminder of the requirement for a nation to
maintain the delicate balance in strategic calculations. The problems
experienced by the United States, in both a military and a political sense, are
manifestations of the attempt to come to grips with its first experience with
limited war as a "super power." The political and military leadership of the
United States had experienced the unconditional victory over the Axis
powers in the Second World War, to define the requirements for a
conditional victory was unusual. The volatile situation was first created by
the North Korean invasion, and then maintained in the aftermath of the
Inchon landing and pursuit to the north across the 38th parallel; this led to
the intervention by the Chinese communist forces, causing the war to settle
into a military and political stalemate near the pre-war border. The eventual
result of the Korean War overshadows the operational brilliance of the
Inchon campaign.
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A. U.S. JOINT SERVICE ORGANIZATION
One aspect of the Inchon campaign was the successful blending of ground,
naval, and air forces into a coherent whole. This occurred within the context
of the development of the U.S. joint service organization. For much of its
history, the United States was insulated from the international system, yet
able to pursue an expansionist policy on the North American continent. The
effect of this unique heritage on the nation's armed forces resulted in neither
the army nor the navy being a traditionally dominant service. Both the army
and the navy served the nation selectively and discretely, and not in the
manner traditionally associated with the development of the armed forces on
the European continent. Despite the usual separation of the administration
and operation of the two services, the services had managed to cooperate
when required. In the Mexican-American War, the landings at Vera Cruz in
1847 led directly to the conclusion of that war. In the American Civil War,
Federal forces conducted riverine operations in the western theater and
amphibious operations in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean which led to
the isolation and eventual surrender of the Confederate States. A
characteristic of these examples of inter-service cooperation were that,
although the framework was often established from a centralized location,
the detailed control was left to commanders at the local level.
During the Spanish-American War, inter-service coordination was
highly unsatisfactory. In 1903, after an analysis of operations, the Secretary of
War Elihu Root and the Secretary of the Navy John D. Long resolved to
rectify the problem. (Caraley, 1966, p. 6) Their solution was the same as the
solution being pursued by the leading military nations of the world at that
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time: reorganize along the lines of the Prussian/German General Staff.
(Kennedy, 1985, p. 3) The reformers assumed that better joint administration
would lead to better joint operations.
At this point a distinction should be made between military operations
and military administration. Effective operations depend on the combat
capabilities of the armed forces; administration involves the formation,
maintenance, and training of the armed forces. These two functions are
interrelated, but might not necessarily require the same organization to
accomplish them. A further general point concerns two models guiding the
organization of forces for joint operations. "Mutual cooperation", which was
the accepted doctrinal practice in the U.S. armed forces until 1942, requires
that the units of each service remain under the command of the senior officer
of that service in the theater; joint actions depend upon agreement and
cooperation between the senior army and navy officer in the theater.
"Unified command" assigns one officer, from any service and advised by a
joint staff, general control of all forces in a theater; the unified commander is
responsible for directing all operations in that theater.
The reformers under Root were not able to implement all of their
intended reforms. One reform in particular was the Joint Army and Navy
Board, formed in 1903, to consider ". . . all matters requiring the cooperation
of the two Services in an effort to reach agreement on a program acceptable to
both." (Morton, 1957, p. 37) The membership of the Joint Board consisted of
eight, individually selected senior officers. The Joint Board functioned
successfully for a period of time, in part developing war plans. However, if
serious disagreement existed among its members, it was unable to make and
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enforce unpopular decisions. By the time of the First World War, the Joint
Board had lost favor with the President Woodrow Wilson, and met only
twice during that conflict.
In 1919, the Army recommended that the Joint Board be reinstituted and
reorganized, to include membership dependant upon billet and a subordinate
committee to conduct detailed war planning. Nonetheless, the Joint Board
was a deliberative body to coordinate Army and Navy policy, and not a
command body to provide joint strategic direction of military operations.
(Caraley, 1966, p. 15) As U.S. involvement in World War Two approached
and collaboration with the British was arranged through high-level
conferences between the political and military leadership of each nation, an
informal organization comprised of the Army Chief of Staff, the
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the Chief of Naval Operations,
and presided over by the Chief of Staff to the President, was created to parallel
the British Chiefs of Staff. (Caraley, 1966, p. 16) This body which became
known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was never formally authorized in writing.
(Caraley, 1966, p. 17)
After the war, the continuing status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came into
question along with the future organization of the armed forces of the United
States. Many believed that the JCS organization had been an important
contribution, managing the U.S. role in the Allied victory. (Korb, 1976, p. 15)
The National Security Act of 1947 legitimized the role of the JCS in the
United States military establishment. Seven specific duties were assigned to
the JCS through this legislation. The Joint Chiefs were to prepare strategic
plans, prepare logistic plans, establish unified commands in strategic areas of
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national interest, formulate joint training policies, formulate military
education policies, review personnel and logistic requirements submitted by
the services, and provide representatives to the Military Staff Committee of
the United Nations. (Historical Division, 1979, pp. 32-33)
Another development from World War Two that had an effect on the
post-war organization of the armed forces, in combination with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was the establishment of vast theaters of operations. In the
Spring of 1942 the British and American leaders divided the world into three
geographical areas with assigned responsibilities of command where Allied
forces were operating: the Pacific Area under American command, the Indian
Ocean and Middle East Area under British command, and the Atlantic and
European Area under shared command. (Caraley, 1966, pp. 17-18) After the
war, the United States used this concept of operational theater command,
developed as a requirement of coalition warfare, and applied it to peacetime
requirements for national security.
The first Unified Command Plan, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was approved by the President on 14 December 1946 and consisted of seven
joint commands and two single-service commands. Eight of these
commands were based on geography and included the Far East Command,
composed of the Japanese Islands, Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, the
Marianas Islands, and the Bonin Islands; the Pacific Command; the Alaskan
Command; the European Command; the Atlantic Command; the Caribbean
Command; the Northeast Command, composed of Greenland and Iceland;
and the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command.
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The Strategic Air Command was the only functional command included in
the initial plan. (Committee, 1985, p. 279)
A final development, which was a carryover from the wartime practices
of the U.S. joint command structure, was the means of control that the
centralized national military command structure used to control the
decentralized operational theater forces. A member of the JCS was designated
as the "executive agent" for each command. (Historical Division, 1979, p. 37)
The executive agent was the head of the service of which the theater
commander was a member, and wrote the operational directives on which
the theater commander was to base his plans. For example, General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff for the Army, was the executive agent for the
European theater.
This practice continued under the post-war unified command structure.
Therefore, a link was established between the joint administrative
organization and joint operational organization of the U.S. armed forces.
B. THEATER OF OPERATIONS
From the perspective of the United States in 1950, Korea was a secondary,
and maritime, theater of operations in relation to the main theater of
operations of Western Europe. The following analysis will show some of the
interrelationships between these two theaters, within the larger context of the
U.S. national security problem. The period from 1945 to 1950 is rich in
complexity, and can be analyzed from many different organizational,
technological, and ideological viewpoints; the process here will not cover in
depth many of the major antecedents to the Korean War. The following
section reviews the U.S. perception of threats to its national security, the
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major political and military policies it considered in deterring and countering
those threats, and the available military force to commit to the Korean
theater, all of which is essential to understand the Korean campaign in the
context of a primary/secondary theater relationship.
1. Threats to U.S. National Security
United States policy tended to diverge from its apparent unity at the
conclusion of the Second World War. On one hand, there was a desire to
return to normalcy, putting the experiences of the depression of the 1930s and
the war behind the country and to look forward to a better future. As a result,
the government sought to rapidly demobilize the armed forces and to reduce
federal spending in order to free the resources required to build a peacetime
society and economy. On the other hand, there was a realization that the end
of the war did not bring an end to conflict, and that the long term interests of
the United States required that it assume a dominant role in world affairs.
Problems within the international system included the future status of
Germany and Japan, the expansion of totalitarian communism, and pressure
to decolonize Asia and Africa. From the start of the period, finding a match
between desired ends and available means was elusive.
In terms of immediate national security interests, the relationship
with the Soviet Union was the most important. There was always an
element of distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States during
World War Two, despite their status as allies. In the immediate post-war era,
both nations groped for a means of restructuring the world. In the closing
days of the war, there was an attempt at accommodation. After a series of
fruitless negotiations with the Soviets over the status of Eastern Europe, a
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turning point came within the government. As the Soviets came to be seen
as a threat, the policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union moved
from accommodation to containment.
Containment of the Soviet expansion of influence as a policy grew
out of the perception that Soviet post-war goals were widely divergent from
those of the United States. The original concept of containment was first
expressed by George Kennan in 1947 when he was serving as counsel to the
embassy in Moscow. At the time, the political leadership in Washington,
D.C. was receiving mixed signals from the Soviet government concerning
their intentions. In a diplomatic cable, Kennan articulated the "sources of
Soviet conduct."
Briefly stated, Kennan's message portrayed the Soviet leadership
viewing the world as hostile, and they themselves were insecure in their
positions. The Soviets were using the ideology of communism to cloak their
authoritarian rule within the Soviet Union to control their population; to
gain greater security, they sought to extend the power of the Soviet Union
geographically and politically by any means at their disposal, though not
necessarily in a dramatic move. (Gaddis, 1982, pp. 33-36) To the U.S. military,
tempered by four years of war, the Soviet Union fit the profile of how an
enemy should look: an expansionist dictatorship. (Sherry, 1977, p. 215)
This containment policy did not necessarily require a military
component. Containment emphasized psychological, social, and economic
forces in which the United States and the Western democracies held an
advantage. By strengthening its own societies, the West would prevail, in
time, over the authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union. The response by the
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United States should be to strengthen the domestic and social institutions of
the nation, and extend assistance to friendly powers.
At the end of World War Two, seemingly U.S. interests were evenly
divided between Western Europe and the Far East. The inability of the U.S. to
affect the outcome of the Chinese Civil War resulted in a drastic reduction of
the interest of the U.S. in Asia. The nation came to view the Philippines and
Japan as bulwarks against unfavorable developments on the Asian mainland.
By 1949, the perception in the United States of the threat from
totalitarian communism deepened due to the alliance between Stalin and
Mao, and the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb. The spectre of universal
communism led by the Soviets who were determined to expand their
influence caused the United States to reassess the threat to its interests. The
participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty organization in
1949, forming an alliance with the nations of Western Europe, allowed the
nation to take action to protect the national interest that was most threatened
by the Soviets.
2. Political-Military Considerations
The development of a strategy to protect U.S. interests from the
perceived threat of the Soviet Union was an evolutionary process. As the
war ended, a debate ensued over the future size of the armed forces. Political
leaders were still formulating a national strategy for the post-war period at the
same time that they were responding to domestic demands for
demobilization. A major consideration was how best to deter an enemy from
attacking the U.S. or its allies. Another consideration in this process of
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formulating a strategy was a proposal to adopt Universal Military Training
(UMT).
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, was a major
proponent of UMT. From his perspective, the two major wars of the
Twentieth Century which involved the United States were won on the ability
of the nation to bring overwhelming force to bear on the enemy.
Additionally, these wars were not prevented because the United States did
not appear ready to enter the war. Thus, the United States was forced to rely
on the strength of other nations to keep the enemy at bay until the latent
strength of the U.S. could be mobilized. Proponents of UMT observed that
there were no longer any potential allied nations strong enough to carry the
fight for the U.S. until ready, and that modern weapons could strike the
nation, and prevent it from mobilizing. Thus, UMT and a ready industrial
infrastructure would be required to deter a foreign power from attacking the
nation at the onset. (Sherry, 1977, pp. 200-201)
The Congress was not swayed by this argument, and neither were
other military leaders, who preferred to keep a sizeable professional force
ready to strike quickly to enforce U.S. policy and thereby work to deter war. In
an era of economy, neither side won. Drastic cost-cutting gutted the ability to
provide for an adequate professional standing military, and although
legislation to extend the draft was approved, UMT was not enacted.
Military planning concentrated solely on general war as the only
contingency. In addition to this, weapons technology, in the form of long
range bombers and atomic weapons, had added another dimension to
military operations. Prior to this development, military forces were allocated
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to different geographic theaters to execute a national grand strategy to fight
the enemy and accomplish political objectives. Utilizing the new military
dimension, planes armed with atomic bombs could be dispatched from one
geographical theater into another, to bomb the sources of the enemy's
strength; a reversion to the Air Power theories of the 1930s.
For a period of time, some were convinced that the new weapons-
technology dimension had made the geographic paradigm irrelevant. Partly
by default and partly by design, the role of "defense" was left to the ability of
the Air Force to deliver the atomic bomb to deter or to bomb an enemy to
force surrender. The defense establishment became enamored with the
atomic weapon; it was thought to make obsolete ground and naval forces.
Based on a short-term, narrow calculation of costs, it was considered much
cheaper than ground and air forces. This new dimension required a degree of
political and moral risk that its proponents chose to ignore. The Korean War
partially reestablished the geographic paradigm, and its use as a complement
to a national security posture which seeks to shape the international system
and confront it when necessary.
The relationship between Europe and Asia was reflected in the war
plan approved in December of 1949 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS
expected a Soviet attack from the East Europe into the West Europe. In
response, the U.S. would attempt to maintain a bridgehead on the continent,
or failing that, attempt to reestablish a presence as soon as possible. In the
Pacific, the United States would assume a strategic and tactical defensive.
Refusing any military operations on the Asian mainland, the Philippines,
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Japan, and Okinawa would be defended, and Taiwan would be denied the
enemy. (Schnabel and Watson, 1979, p. 47)
The President came to see the deterrent posture of the United States
as being compromised by an over-reliance on the atomic bomb and the
weakness of general purpose forces, given the increasing threat from the
Soviet Union. He requested a study from a group headed by Paul Nitze to
evaluate the security problems of the nation. The result was the document
called NSC-68, which built upon the concept of containment, but due to the
increased perception of Communist military and political strength, it seemed
to emphasize the military component rather than other aspects of that policy.
NSC-68 called for an expansion of the armed forces of the United States of
both general purpose and nuclear forces. This document was ready in April
1950, but the proposed policy of spending money on the military during a
period of fiscal austerity was controversial. The invasion of South Korea by
North Korea on 25 June 1950 seemed to force the issue; a larger military
establishment would be required to meet the perceived threat posed by the
Soviets and world communism.
President Truman viewed the attack on South Korea by the North
Koreans as the preliminary to an attack on Europe by the Soviets. The
President believed that the inaction of the Western Democracies in the 1930s
when Japan invaded Manchuria and Germany expanded its borders in
Europe was a cause of the Second World War. Guided by the strategy of
containment, as implemented by NSC-68, the United States committed its
forces in South Korea, with the approval of the Security Council of the
United Nations.
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The connection of this action in Korea to the main theater consists of
two separate aspects with the opposite effect. First, the primary international
interest of the United States that was threatened by the Soviets was Europe.
The United States sought to protect this interest through the formation of an
alliance. For that alliance to be able to confront the Soviet Union, it had to be
both politically united and militarily strong. Through its action in Korea, the
United States hoped to prove to its European allies and to the Soviet Union
that it had the will to act decisively; simply stated, it acted to build credibility
to strengthen the alliance and to deter the Soviet Union. Second, at the same
time that the U.S. was attempting to appear credible through strengthening
the military power of the alliance, it was diverting its limited assets to fight in
Korea. NSC-68 was not yet in effect; the expansion of the armed forces for
which it provided had not begun. There was a period of severe shortfalls in
the forces available to meet commitments in both Europe and Korea.
3. Military Considerations
In the summer of 1950, the Army was composed of ten undermanned
divisions, the Marine Corps consisted of two undermanned divisions, the Air
Force consisted of 48 wings, and the Navy consisted of 671 ships. (Weigley,
1973, p. 368) One factor which made intervention feasible were the units that
were in close geographical proximity to Korea stationed in the Far East
Command and Pacific. The Far East Command was one of eight unified
commands in the U.S. command structure to which units were assigned
when forward deployed. This command was responsible for the defense of
Japan, Okinawa, the Marianas Islands, and the Philippines. (Field, 1962, p. 44)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff increased this geographical area of responsibility to
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include Korea on 25 June 1950. General MacArthur, Commander in Chief,
Far East Command (CINCFE) was also authorized to send military equipment
authorized by U.S. military advisors in the Republic of Korea; to employ Air
Force and Navy forces to establish a safe zone in the vicinity of Seoul to aid
evacuation of U.S. nationals; and to prepare to employ forces of the Far East
Command and the Seventh Fleet in direct action in support of South Korea,
below the 38th parallel, if authorized by the U.N. Security Council. (Schnabel
and Watson, 1979, pp. 72-73) On 30 June 1950, the JCS gave CINCFE authority
to commit Army forces in Korea.
Given its status as a unified command, Far East Command should
have had three subordinate component commands from each service;
however, MacArthur chose to keep the Army forces directly subordinate to
his General Headquarters, without an intermediate component commander.
A Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group was established on 20 August
1949; it was composed of representatives of each service and was supervised
by General Wright, G-3 of the Far East Command. It served throughout the
war as the principal planning agency for the U.N. Command. (Appleman,
1961, p. 51)
The Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Walton H.
Walker, controlled the ground forces assigned to the Far East Command. Its
mission included participation in the occupation of Japan; because of the
administrative nature of this responsibility and of the lack of suitable training
areas in Japan, these divisions were not fully trained and ready for combat
operations. Additionally, each division was manned at seventy percent of
wartime strength. The units assigned to the Eighth Army were the 7th, 24th,
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and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division. (Appleman, 1961,
pp. 49-50)
Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy was Commander Naval Forces Far
East. Navy. Subordinate units included TF 90, Amphibious Force Far East,
and TF 96, U.S. Naval Forces Japan. TF 90, under the command of Rear
Admiral James H. Doyle, consisted of the five ships of Amphibious Group
One. This unit was not normally assigned to the Far East Command, but was
deployed to the area to conduct training with the army forces in Japan. TF 96
consisted of one light cruiser, four destroyers, one submarine, one British
patrol craft, and six minesweepers. (Field, 1962, pp. 45-46)
The forward deployed ships of the Pacific Fleet were assigned to the
Seventh Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble.
Seventh Fleet was under the operational command of the Pacific Command;
when operating in support of the Far East Command, it came under the
operational control of Commander Naval Forces Far East. Seventh Fleet
consisted of one carrier task group, designated TF 77, and comprised of one
aircraft carrier, a cruiser in support, and a screening group of eight destroyers;
a logistics support group; four submarines; and a patrol aircraft wing. The
primary logistics base for the Seventh Fleet was Subic Bay in the Philippines.
(Field, 1962, 47-48)
Support for South Korea was also provided by British
Commonwealth forces beginning on 29 June 1950. Initially, a British light
carrier and escorts were available; Australian, Canadian, and New Zealander
ships were also pledged to join the United Nations forces. (Field, 1962, p. 55)
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Far East Air Forces (FEAF) were under the command of Lieutenant
General George E. Stratemeyer; under his command were the largest
concentration of USAF strength outside of the continental United States.
FEAF consisted of Fifth Air Force based in Japan, Thirteenth Air Force based
in the Philippines, and Twentieth Air Force based on Okinawa. Assets
immediately available within range of Korea included four squadrons of
fighter planes, a light bomb wing, and a troop carrier wing. (Appleman, 1961,
p. 50)
C DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
The terrain of Korea presents a challenge to a commander considering
offensive operations. The Korean peninsula is bordered on the east by the
Sea of Japan, on the south by the Korean Strait, and on the west by the Yellow
Sea. Most of the northern border connecting it with the Manchuria on the
Asian mainland is formed by two rivers, the Yalu flowing west into the
Yellow Sea and the Temar flowing east into the Sea of Japan. In the east, high
mountains rise from the coastal area; there are few natural harbors and the
tide does not vary drastically. The south and the east coast has an indented
coastline and a large tidal range. The terrain in the west is rugged, but not as
mountainous as the eastern portion of the country. (Appleman, 1960, pp. 1-2)
The terrain channeled the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel
into a minor attack in the east between the sea and the coastal mountain
range, another moderate-sized attack in the center of the peninsula, and the
greatest weight of the attack on Seoul in the west. Seoul was a crucial
communications center; its capture on 28 June compromised the ROK
defense. The piecemeal introduction of U.S. troops of the 24th Infantry
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Division beginning on 1 July, added to the air support provided by Air Force
and Navy aircraft, slowed but did not stop the North Koreans. Sustained
combat eventually weakened the units of the North Korean Peoples' Army
(NKPA), and substantial reinforcement allowed a defensive perimeter to be
established within 30 miles of Pusan by early August.
1. Concept for an Amphibious Landing
Even as the U.N. forces sought to slow the NKPA offensive, General
MacArthur explored options to gain the initiative and defeat the North
Koreans. By mid-July he envisioned a campaign composed of three phases:
Phase I, halt the NKPA advance; Phase II, reinforce the UN forces in the
Pusan perimeter to permit offensive action; and Phase III, an amphibious
counterstroke, in conjunction with a breakout from the perimeter. The
assumptions of this campaign plan were: (1) the NKPA ground advance
would be stopped and reinforcements for U.N. forces would be available, (2)
the build-up would be sufficient to allow for U.N. offensive operations in the
vicinity of Pusan, (3) U.N. forces would retain air and naval superiority in the
theater, (4) North Korea would not be reinforced by either the Soviet Union
or People's Republic of China, and (5) the center of gravity of the NKPA
would remain in the south and that the Inchon sector would not be
reinforced. (Montross and Canzona, 1955, p. 57)
The selection of a landing site created some controversy. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff agreed to the concept of a landing behind enemy lines, if the
tactical situation was favorable to the maneuver. The JCS did not agree to a
specific landing site. General MacArthur desired to land at Inchon, which
was a communications center for which the NKPA logistics support flowed
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for its forces in the south. He considered the amphibious landing the most
powerful military device available to him; he wanted to sever the the North
Korean supply lines and destroy the NKPA. (Appleman, 1961, p. 493)
MacArthur planned to strike in mid-September. This maneuver entailed a
great deal of risk due to the numerous disadvantages to landing at Inchon,
which was expressed by Navy and Marine Corps planners and by the JCS.
(Appleman, 1962, pp. 492-494)
The disadvantages of conducting an amphibious assault at Inchon
could be grouped into physical obstacles, military handicaps, and political
hurdles. (Cagle, 1954, p. 47) There were considerable physical obstacles
confronting the Navy attack force and Marine Corps landing force. Inchon
was situated on the west coast of Korea and served as the sea port for Seoul, 20
miles inland. It was reached from the sea by the 45 nautical mile Flying Fish
Channel, which was narrow and shallow. Tides average 29 feet in Inchon
harbor; the next sequence of high tides able to accommodate amphibious
landing ships would occur on 15 September and last for four days, not to
occur again until October.
The island of Wolmi-do separates the outer harbor from the inner
harbor, dominating the approaches to the city. It was connected to the
mainland by a causeway that was a half-mile long. The North Koreans had
fortified the island, so that a preliminary landing would have to be made to
capture it before the main landings could occur. There were no suitable
beaches on which to land the main assault force. The main assault would
have to be made onto a sea wall adjacent to the center of the city. Attacking
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into an urban area from the sea was a unique task for U.S. amphibious forces.
(Cagle, 1954, pp. 47-48)
The military handicaps of landing at Inchon included assembling a
force large enough to conduct the operation; finding sufficient lift to transport
the force to Inchon; and an inadequate amount of time to both plan the
embarkation, assault, and follow-on operations and conduct a rehearsal.
MacArthur had requested a Marine division in July. Most active-duty combat
forces from the west coast, a regimental combat team of the 1st Marine
Division, had been sent to Korea and were fighting in the perimeter as the
First Provisional Marine Brigade. To find additional amphibious-trained
troops, and then to find troops to replace them in the perimeter, would be a
challenge. Through a call-up of reserves, and by taking cadres from the 2nd
Marine Division on the east coast, one additional regiment was formed. A
third regiment was to be formed from additional reserves and from a
battalion that was currently deployed in the Mediterranean. To replace the
regiment in the perimeter, a regiment from the 7th Infantry Division would
act as a floating reserve, embarked onboard its transports, until the effects of
the amphibious landing had reduced enemy pressure on the Pusan
perimeter. (Appleman, 1961, p. 496-497)
The expeditionary force was to be called X Corps, under the command
of Major General Edward M. Almond. It was to be comprised of the 1st
Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Bringing the 7th Infantry
Division up to a wartime complement was also difficult. It had been used to
fill up shortfalls in the units sent to Korea. To fill its ranks, the division was
reinforced with South Korean recruits and with all replacements arriving
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into the theater from the United States from 23 August to 3 September.
(Appleman, 1961, pp. 491-492) MacArthur had also requested paratroop units
for the operation. The 187th RCT had been sent, but with the provision that
it not be used in a combat jump until 29 September because it was
undertrained. (Montross and Canzona, 1955, p. 172) They were to serve as X
Corps reserve during the Inchon operation. (Appleman, 1961, p. 503n.) A unit
of ROK Marines also served as part of X Corps reserve, and was not to
participate in the initial assault.
The ships which transferred the Marines from the continental United
States to Japan, in addition to those already in the theater, were to serve as the
nucleus of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF). Additional ships were
chartered merchants, and some were recommissioned vessels from the
Shipping Control Administration Japan (SCAJAP).
Operation Chromite was planned in 23 days. By the standards of the
Second World War, the time available to plan Operation Chromite was
severely truncated. Given a period of less than a month, plans had to be
made to gather, organize, and land over 70,000 men, equipment, and supplies
of X Corps through Inchon.
Political problems involved trying to ascertain the reaction of China
and the Soviet Union to the Inchon landing. Since Operation Chromite had
the potential to drastically alter the course of the war through decisive
military action, it might prod the larger communist powers to enter the war.
Although the Navy and Marine amphibious planners recommended
other landing sites, MacArthur insisted that the landing take place at Inchon.
In a meeting on 23 July in Tokyo, he outlined his plan to representatives
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from the JCS, and they tentatively approved his plan on 28 August.
MacArthur issued his operations order for Operation Chromite on 30 August.
The NKPA had begun a final offensive with the remainder of their strength
on the lines of the Pusan perimeter in early September. This caused the Joint
Chiefs some concern, and twice on 5 September and 7 September they
requested that MacArthur reconsider his plans for a counter-offensive.
(Appleman, 1961, pp. 494-495) MacArthur was undeterred; he responded to
the JCS that his plans remained unchanged and that although he was aware
of the risk, he was certain that the perimeter at Pusan would hold and that
the Inchon landing would have the desired effect of "wresting the initiative
from the enemy and thereby presenting an opportunity for a decisive blow."
(Schnabel and Watson, 1979, p. 213) The JCS sent their final approval of the
plan on 8 September. (Schnabel and Watson, 1979, p. 214) The success of the
Korean campaign depended on the ability of the 1st Marine Division to attack
from the sea.
2. U.S. Amphibious Warfare Doctrine
A number of factors came together during the interwar period of
1919-1940 which led to the development of U.S. amphibious warfare doctrine.
Among the first of the factors was the search by the United States Marine
Corps for a new institutional mission. The Marines were in a difficult
position: in the First World War, they had served with distinction, integrated
into Army divisions deployed in France; after the war they had reverted to
their role as an international police force in China and Latin America.
Permanent absorption into the Army was not palatable, and the role of
enforcer for the President of the United States was loosing its respectability in
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the changing international political climate after 1933. Visionary members of
the Corps thought that an expansion of one of the assigned missions,
defending advanced naval bases, could be parlayed into an offensive mission
of acquiring advanced naval bases within the context of a naval campaign.
(Rosen, 1988, pp. 160-161)
This merged with the second factor: the theory of sea power espoused
by Admiral Mahan and a major tenet of U.S. Navy doctrine. Naval strategists
and war planners concentrated almost exclusively on a future Pacific Ocean
war, both before the First World War, and then during the interwar period.
The protection of the Philippines from the rising power of Japanese
imperialism provided the context. The greatest constraint on American
naval operations was the distance between the United States and the Western
Pacific Ocean, which more thoughtful planners recognized would hinder
logistic support for fleet operations. That the isolated islands of the Central
Pacific Ocean would serve as support for fleet operations seemed the obvious
solution. That many of these islands might be garrisoned by Japanese troops
was to provide the motivation to develop an amphibious assault doctrine
and techniques for implementing that doctrine.
The concept was slow to gain favor in any of the services; critics
pointed to the failure at Gallipoli as proof that hostile shores could not be
assaulted. However, by 1933 the Joint Army and Navy Board had considered
a doctrine which provided a framework for joint overseas expeditions. This
was published in a pamphlet that suggested a method of preparing plans for
such an operation, provided a number of definitions and solutions for the
technical problems of amphibious assault, and, primarily, stated many of the
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problems expected to be encountered in such an operation. (Isely and Crowl,
1951, p. 35)
The staff and students at Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia
expanded this pamphlet into a larger publication entitled the Tentative
Manual for Landing Operations, which was completed by 1934. The manual
divided landing operations into five sequential phases: Planning,
Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement (to the objective area), and Assault. In
the assault phase, success is dependent upon the interaction of six component
parts: command relations, naval gunfire support, aerial support, ship-to-
shore movement, securing the beachhead, and logistics. (Isely and Crowl,
1951, p. 37) The concept of an amphibious assault was merely a direct attack in
the style of the First World War upon a prepared enemy position, with naval
gunfire replacing massed artillery fires and troops transported to the critical
point of attack by small boats rather than by marching. The margin of error
for a direct attack against prepared enemy positions is low, and chances of
success are made lower when the attack is being made from the tactical
deployment of transport shipping. The above six components must mesh as
nearly perfectly as possible if the attacker is to gain a foothold on the enemy
shore to then build up combat power effectively, allowing the attacker to shift
from an amphibious battle to a land battle, leading ultimately to the
accomplishment of the force's objective.
Each of the six elements was touched upon in the planning process.
Command relationships in Navy-Marine operations were not generally a
problem; a parallel chain of command was established between the landing
force commander and the naval supporting forces commander with a
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common superior, the naval attack force commander. This resulted in a mix
of joint and unified command. Cooperative and parallel planning was done
at lower levels, with differences resolved by a common superior.
Planning for naval gunfire and aerial support received considerable
attention. New techniques had to be developed to fully exploit gun,
munition, and aviation technology. In an operation, plans for the sequencing
and timing of fires had to be supported by extensive communications
planning in order to coordinate actions.
Ship-to-shore movement is the arrangement of the tactical
movement of the assault force to the beach in the space of the objective area,
and the arrangement in time of the loading of assault craft and the speed of
advance to the beach, coordinated with available supporting fires and close air
support. This component of the assault also required specialized techniques
and equipment, especially amphibian tractors, landing craft, and transport
ships such as the Landing Ship Tank and Landing Ship Dock. The
deployment of those assets in an ideal location to preserve the momentum of
the advance of troops across the beach upon landing had to mesh exactly with
supporting fires.
These elements created a favorable tactical situation to seize the
immediate landing area from its defenders. At this point, it is essential to
create sufficient momentum of forces arriving ashore to carry the battle
inland, away from the beach. As the beach is secured, and the combat troops
gain room to maneuver, reinforcements and supplies to allow continual
expansion of the beachhead must begin to come ashore. Specialized teams of
the Landing Force Shore Party and Naval Beachgroup arrive just behind the
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first waves of combat troops to organize the beach and to keep the flow of
material and men moving across the beach.
A great deal of forethought is required to ensure that the proper units
and supplies are available at the proper time. This depends ultimately on the
embarkation of the transport vessels, which must match the landing force
commander's landing plan and scheme of maneuver ashore. Embarkation
which allows for the effective prosecution of the battle ashore usually does
not result in an efficient allocation of space onboard ship. The tradeoff
between the efficient utilization of the limited volume of available transport,
or "administrative loading", and the effective support of combat operations,
or "combat loading", is reflected in the embarkation plan.
This planning system and warfare doctrine provided the framework
for essentially all of the Anglo-American landings in the global allied
offensive which characterized the later stages of the Second World War.
These landings could be conceptualized as three separate and distinct types of
amphibious campaigns, the form of each determined by the geography,
objectives, and enemy forces in the theater. In the European Theater,
amphibious operations were conducted to bridge barriers of water: the
Atlantic Ocean in the North African landings, the Mediterranean Sea in the
Sicilian, Italian, and Southern France landings, and the English Channel in
the Normandy landings.
In the Central Pacific Theater, amphibious operations were conducted
to complement a naval campaign to establish sea control leading to the
intended isolation of the Japanese home islands. The ocean was considered
an avenue of advance rather than as a barrier. Individual positions were
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captured to provide stepping stones for the next operation in the sequence.
The captured islands then served as intermediate bases for forward deployed
naval forces, providing locations for prompt maintenance and supply, and as
air bases which supplemented logistic support, aided sea control operations,
and supported the strategic bombing campaign of Japan.
In the Southwest Pacific Theater, under the command of General
Douglas MacArthur, amphibious operations were conducted as an integral
part of a fluid campaign integrating land, sea, and air forces in a progressive
offensive campaign. The emphasis of these operations was to maintain the
initiative on the ground; and the sea was a medium to complement the land.
Amphibious landings avoided concentrations of the enemy; instead, they
were part of a larger operation to envelope enemy forces and attack
communications. It was these operations that provided the roots of
Operation Chromite.
3. The Planning Process
The planners for Operation Chromite, based on their personal and
institutional experience acquired during World War n, utilized a systematic
approach in preparation for an amphibious operation, although the process
was considerably abbreviated due to the limited time available before
execution of the plan. The considerations of time, space, and means required
to achieve the objective were subjected to a systematic approach. An
important aspect of the planning process is the establishment of parallel
chains of command between ground and supporting navy units.
Limitations of time were overcome by utilizing verbal, rather than
written, coordination between commands and often by inverting the
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planning sequence between higher headquarters and subordinate commands.
Also, some of the personnel were planning for the Inchon landing while
concurrently conducting operations in the Pusan perimeter. Despite these
deviations from accepted practice, the results of the planning process clearly
followed from accepted doctrinal practices.
The primary temporal consideration of Operation Chromite was the
date of 15 September, coinciding with hydrographic conditions providing
sufficient depth for landing craft to beach close enough to the land. From this
date, plans were worked backwards to coordinate the availability of forces and
to organize embarkation and movement to the objective area.
Another consideration related to time was the sequence of
operations, or the relative relationships of different aspects of the operation.
Amphibious operations usually consist of a set sequence of actions. The first
is preparation and isolation of the objective area, usually through air
interdiction and deception; the second is preassault operations, consisting of
reconnaissance, minesweeping, and demolition of beach obstacles; the third is
the assault itself, culminating in the capture of the force beachhead line; the
operations then shift into the land phase, consisting of the exploitation of the
landing to capture the task force objectives. Each sequence of action is
dependant upon the relative success of the preceding phase.
Considerations of space were put into the design of the Amphibious
Objective Area (AOA). To landward are the beach centers, the Force
Beachhead Line, target lists for naval gunfire and close air support, and
various geographic objectives included in the scheme of maneuver. To
seaward are the boat lanes, lines of departure, and various subareas such as
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the Carrier Operating Area, Fire Support Areas, and Transport Echelon Areas.
More than drawing lines on a map or chart, the organization of the AOA
serves as a coordinating mechanism which reduces unnecessary
communications, and saves rime and effort that otherwise would be spent in
minute-to-minute coordination between units.
It was essential that the Commander of the Joint Task Force control
the sea, air, and land contained within the AOA to successfully complete his
mission. With regards to the control of airspace, this was a departure from
the practice followed in Korea, until Operation Chromite, whereby
Commander Far East Air Forces had exercised centralized coordination and
control of all air space. In order to adequately support the ground forces
ashore and to defend the Amphibious Task Force, the Joint Task Force
Commander was given control of all air space within the AOA.
The means, or military forces, assembled to execute Operation
Chromite were large, though not in the continental sense. Nonetheless, an
adequate mechanism to organize the forces was required in order to exercise
sufficient control over them. Until the conclusion of the assault phase, all
units came under the navy practice of assigning numbered task designators to
each subordinate unit based on component missions within the overall plan.
Each task designator is in effect for the length of time required. In this way
the original plan can assign units to different commanders and different
component missions, then easily transfer the unit to another commander,
without requiring positive action by the commander during the operation.
As dictated by the situation in the course of the campaign, the original tactical
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organization, serving as a familiar basis for change, can be altered relatively
easily.
D. THE PLAN
The date designated for D-Day was 15 September 1950. L-Hour was the
time for the preliminary assault on Wolmi-do, and it was designated as 0630
hours. H-hour was the time for the main assault, and it was designated as
1730 hours. JTF 7 and the AOA became operational on D minus 5 days and
was to be dissolved upon transfer of control of ground operations was
transferred to the Commanding General, X Corps.
To landward, the AOA was an arc thirty miles inland from the landing
site. (Appleman, 1960, p. 497) To seaward, the AOA was enclosed by a square
of 100 nautical miles sides, the center of the area was located at 37-1 ON, 125-
20E. (Field, 1962, p. 189) Within the AOA were four landing beaches. RED
Beach was adjacent to the city, north of the harbor and led onto a sea wall.
GREEN Beach was on the channel side of the island of Wolmi-Do. BLUE
Beach was southeast of the city; the boat lane approaching this beach was over
very shallow water, useable only to amphibian tractors and small landing
craft, it was to be used only for the assault. YELLOW Beach was located inside
the harbor and was to be used for the administrative off load of troops and
supplies after the beachhead was secured.
There were three Fire Support Areas (FSAs): FSA I was farthest from the
assault beaches and was to be used by cruisers with larger caliber, longer range
guns; FSA II was to be used by destroyers in support of BLUE Beach; and FAS
III was to be used by destroyers in support of RED Beach. (Montros and
Canzona, 1955, pp. 67-69) Both the fast carrier task force and the escort carrier
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task force required sea room to conduct flight operations; two area were
designated; the CV OPAREA was a circle centered on 35N, 125-30E, with a
diameter of 25 NM; the CVE OPAREA was a circle centered on 37-1ON, 125-
20E, with a diameter of 12 NM. (Field, 1962, p. 189)
In addition to planning movement within the AOA, the movement of
the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) from the different embarkation ports to
the AOA had to be carefully planned. Entry into the AOA by the amphibious
transports carrying the assault forces had to be in the proper sequence. This
was complicated by the different embarkation ports and different ship speeds
within each task group of assault shipping. It was during the movement
phase of the operation that different elements of each task group would join
together into the proper order. In all there were six increments of transports.
These different increments of the ATF were to join along the Position of
Intended Movement (PIM) at various points along the track: Point IOWA
(100 NM south of Cheju Do) and Point ARKANSAS (60 NM southwest of
Cheju Do). Point CALIFORNIA was to be the terminus, located in the
seaward approaches to Inchon, at the beginning of the Flying Fish Channel.
(Montros and Canzona, 1955, pp. 80-83)
The command structure for Operation Chromite was a mission-organized
joint task force structured as follows: JTF 7 was commanded by Admiral
Struble. His immediate superior was Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces
Far East. Subordinate commanders to Admiral Struble were Admiral Doyle,
Attack Force commander, General Almond, Expeditionary Troops
commander, Admiral Ewen, Fast Carrier Force commander, Captain Austin,
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Logistics Force commander, Admiral Andrews, Covering Force commander,
and Admiral Henderson, Patrol Force commander.
1. Scheme of Maneuver
A "Special Planning Staff" was organized within Far East Command
General Headquarters, and took over responsibility for planning Operation
Chromite in August from the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group.
(Montross and Canzona, 1955, p. 57) This special staff grew into the
headquarters staff of X Corps. By 23 August they had an outline of a plan for
the scheme of maneuver ashore which used the 1st Marine Division as the
assault force and the 7th Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division as
follow-on forces. It was later determined that the 3rd Infantry Division
would not be combat ready in sufficient time to participate in the operation.
The important military objectives in the Inchon-Seoul corridor were
to capture Kimpo Airfield intact, located 12 miles northeast of Inchon, to
capture Seoul and its associated transportation network, and to link-up with
elements of the Eighth Army attacking from the south toward the bridgehead.
Major features of terrain in the corridor are the Han River, numerous hills,
and small towns and villages. A road and a railroad connected Inchon and
Seoul. Detailed intelligence concerning enemy strength and probable reaction
to the landing was not available. It was estimated that only 6,500 enemy
troops were stationed in the objective area, but the availability of reserves
would dictate the character of the fight for Seoul. The reaction of the
planners to the unknown potential strength of the enemy in the objective
area was to not commit the operation to a detailed time schedule, but only to
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identify six geographic phase lines to provide the framework for further
planning. (Montross and Canzona, 1955, p. 58)
The ground forces of JTF 7 were organized into task groups with the
following assignments: (Montross and Canzona, 1955, pp. 57-65; Appleman,
1961, pp. 497-500)
TF 92~Expeditionary Force, consisting of the X Corps, which included
the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and units directly attached
to X Corps. The overall mission of this unit was to capture Seoul and
surrounding terrain to cut the communications of the NKPA units facing the
Eighth Army around the Pusan perimeter. The Xth Corps was not to take
control of operations ashore until the capture of the Force Beachhead Line
(FBHL) and the completion of the amphibious assault phase.
TG 92.1—Landing Force consisting of the 1st Marine Division; its
maneuver elements included RCT 1, RCT 5, and RCT 7. RCT 5 (less BLT 3/5)
was to assault RED Beach at H-Hour, secure the immediate area, then expand
its control into the city. RCT 1 was to land at BLUE Beach at H-Hour, and
advance inland to cut communications to Inchon. On D plus 1 day, both
units were to join and continue to the Force Beachhead Line and continue
the advance in order to exploit the landing. RCT 7 was to debark from TG
90.4 at Inchon on D plus 6 days and join the Division. The Division was to
capture Kimpo Airfield, cross the Han River, secure the high ground to the
north of Seoul, and capture the city. Continued operations would be to
advance north and east of Seoul to assume blocking positions.
TU 92.12.3-Advance Attack Group, consisting of BLT 3/5, with an
attached tank platoon, was to embark onboard shipping of TG 90.1 in Pusan
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for the transit to the AOA. At L-Hour it was to assault GREEN Beach on the
island of Wolmi Do. It was to secure that island and develop a position
strong enough to support the main landing at H-Hour. By D plus 1 day, it was
to rejoin RCT-5 and conduct further combat operations with the landing
force.
TG 92.2-7th Infantry Division was to embark onboard TG 90.8
shipping in Yokohama and transit to the AOA to arrive no later than D plus 1
day. The division was to conduct an administrative landing in the port of
Inchon. The first regiment debarked was to relieve elements of the 1st
Marine Division in the sector south of the Inchon-Seoul road. The division
was to advance on the right flank of the 1st Marine Division to seize the
heights south of Seoul and the Han River, in order to support the capture of
Seoul by the 1st Marine Division. Elements of the division were to then
move south to Suwon to link with units of the Eighth Army advancing
north from Chonan.
2. Supporting Forces
The North Koreans did not have the military power to contest the
control of the sea and air. Therefore, supporting forces could concentrate on
providing direct combat support to the ground scheme of maneuver. A
measure of indirect combat support was required to interdict the movement
of NKPA reinforcements into both the objective area and the main
concentration in the south. Supporting forces also played a role in
transportation of ground forces and required logistics. The interaction of




Naval forces were not required to engage in a large amount of
indirect combat support to gain sea and air control due to the weak North
Korean navy and air force; therefore, indirect combat support consisted of
deception and interdiction operations. Direct combat support consisted of
gunfire and air bombardment of the shore. Key to the operational scheme of
maneuver was the transport of the assault and follow-on ground forces, and
their logistic support.
TF 90—Attack Force was to be the umbrella organization
responsible for the movement to the AOA, combat operations until the
landing force commander was established ashore, and combat and logistics
support from the sea until Operation Chromite was complete. The command
and control apparatus for the assault was to be directly attached to the task
force; this included the Tactical Air Control unit, the Naval Beach Group
unit, the Underwater Demolition Teams, the Boat Control units, and the
Repair and Salvage units. These units were to embark onboard assault
shipping of the subordinate task groups in accordance with the embarkation
plan.
The following subordinate task groups were to provide transport
and combat support to the ground forces of the amphibious operation (Cagle
and Manson, 1957, pp. 85, 503-508; Field, 1962, 179-181):
TG 90.1—Advance Attack Group, consisting of one LSD and three
APDs,. was to embark the Advance Landing Force (BLT 3/5) at Pusan. The
group was to sortie on D minus 2 days, join the main body at Point Arkansas,
and transit to Point California. On D-Day at 0001 hours, TG 90.1 was to
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proceed up Flying Fish Channel following ships of TG 90.6, Gunfire Support
Group, to meet L-Hour for the assault on GREEN Beach.
TG 90.2—Transport Group, consisting of 5 APAs, 8 AKAs, 1 AP,
and 2 LSDs, was to embark, in accordance with the embarkation plan, selected
elements of RCT 1 and other 1st Marine Division units at Kobe, and selected
elements of RCT 5 at Pusan. Between D minus 5 days and D minus 2 days, in
accordance with the sortie plan, the separate elements were to depart port and
transit to the AOA. On D-Day, this group was to conform to the landing plan,
as directed.
TG 90.3~Tractor Group, consisting of 47 LSTs and 1 LSM, was to
embark, in accordance with the embarkation plan, selected elements of RCT 1
and other 1st Marine Division units at Kobe, and selected elements of RCT 5
at Pusan. Between D minus 5 days and D minus 2 days, in accordance with
the sortie plan, the separate elements were to proceed from port and transit to
the AOA. On D-Day, this group was to conform to the landing plan, as
directed.
TG 90.4—Transport Division 14, consisting of 9 amphibious ships,
was to embark RCT 7 at Kobe and elements of MAG 33 at Pusan. This task
group was not scheduled to enter the AOA until D plus 6 days, and was to be
landed administratively
TG 90.5—Air Support Group, consisting of two escort carriers
(with two USMC attack squadrons embarked) and four destroyers as escorts,
was to proceed from Sasebo on D minus 7 days to the CVE Oparea. This unit
was to conduct pre-assault air bombardment and provide close air support to
ground forces as directed.
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TG 90.6-Gunfire Support Group, consisting of a Cruiser Element
of two heavy cruisers and two light cruisers, a Destroyer Element of six
destroyers divided into two fire support units of 3 destroyers each, and an
LSMR Element of three LMSR's (Landing Ship, Medium, Rocket), was to
proceed from Sasebo on D minus 5 days to the AOA. On D-minus 2 days, the
task group was to commence preparatory bombardment of preplanned fires
and repeat the operation if required on D-minus 1 day. Beginning on D-Day,
the task group was to support the assault with on-call fires requested by
ground forces ashore and with preplanned fires. The Fire Support Areas were
to be assigned as follows: Cruiser Element to FSA I, Destroyer Elements to
FSA II and EQ, LMSR Element to designated positions to support assault at H-
Hour.
TG 90.7—Screening and Protective Group, consisting of two
destroyers and eight patrol craft of the USN and Commonwealth navies, was
to provide an escort for amphibious shipping of TF 90 along the transit route.
TG 90.8—Second Echelon Movement Group, consisting of a mix
of three USN, four USNS, and twelve chartered merchant ships was to
embark TG 92.2, the 7th Infantry Division, at Yokohama, and sortie on D
minus 6 days for the transit to the AOA. It was to have the highest priority
for off-loading, after TG 92.1 was ashore.
TG 90.9—Third Echelon Movement Group, consisting of one
USN, two USNS, and thirteen chartered merchant ships, was to embark the
remaining units of TF 92, consisting of troops attached directly to X Corps, at
Yokohama, and sortie on D minus 4 days for the transit to the AOA. It was to
be the last group of transports to be off-loaded.
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TF 91~Blockade and Covering Force, consisting of 10 British
Commonwealth and fifteen ROK ships, including the HMS Triumph, a light
aircraft carrier (CVL), was to (1) operate along the west coast of Korea outside
of the AOA to prevent NK forces from interdicting the movement of TF 90,
(2) conduct special reconnaissance missions and other special operations, and
(3) to interdict and divert NKPA forces from the objective area.
TF 99—Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, consisting of three
seaplane tenders, four USN patrol squadrons and two RAF patrol squadrons,
was to provide long range reconnaissance of enemy forces attempting to enter
the AOA.
TF 77—Fast Carrier Force, consisting of three aircraft carriers (CVs)
with three air groups embarked, and two light cruisers and fourteen
destroyers as escorts, was to sortie from Sasebo and to be on station in the CV
OPAREA beginning on D minus 3 days. The mission was to gain air
supremacy in the AOA, interdict NKPA forces entering the objective area,
and provide deep support and close air support to support the ground scheme
of maneuver.
TF 79—Logistic Force, consisting of twenty USN combat auxiliaries
organized into four subordinate functional groupings, was to provide a
variety of service support to TF 77, TF 90, and TF 91 in the form of
replenishment, rearmament, repair, salvage, and towing.
b. Air Forces
Far East Air Force was to provide indirect combat support and
logistics support for Operation Chromite. B-29 bombing squadrons were to
conduct interdiction operations against railroad marshalling yards leading to
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Seoul from D minus 10 days to D minus 3 days. (Futrell, 1983, p. 151) Logistics
support was to be another important role for ground-based air. Once Kimpo
airfield was captured, it was to serve as an airhead for the movement of
supplies to support the operations at the airfield and to support the ground
forces through the prompt airlift of supplies. It was expected that the cargo
capacity of Inchon and the available ground transport would be saturated.
FEAF was to provide ground engineer units, to repair and maintain Kimpo
airfield, and cargo handling units to unload transport aircraft. FEAF was to
also provide direct combat support to the Eighth Army in the breakout from
the Pusan perimeter. (Futrell, 1983, pp. 151, 160-161)
Once the headquarters of X Corps was established ashore, control
of air space within the objective area was to shift to Tactical Air Command X
(TAC X). It was to coordinate the combat operations of MAG 33 and the
carrier based aircraft in direct support of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th
Infantry Division. MAG 33 was to command the ground-based Marine Corps
squadrons which were to provide a portion of direct combat support, and
were to be based at Kimpo Airfield, once that location was secured by the
ground forces. The command and maintenance elements of MAG 33 were to
redeploy from the perimeter to the objective area onboard TG 90.4 ships.
(Montross and Canzona, 1955, pp. 167-170)
E CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN
Whether the conditions required for Phase IE of the campaign had been
met was subject to interpretation. General Walker, Commanding Officer of
the Eighth Army which was engaged in holding the Pusan perimeter was not
comfortable with the correlation of forces in southeast Korea. MacArthur was
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confident not only that the perimeter would hold, but that the Eighth Army
was strong enough for offensive operations. As originally conceived, the
breakout from the perimeter was to coincide with D-Day for Operation
Chromite. Hoping to gain an advantage from the delayed reaction of the
confusion of the North Koreans caused by the amphibious landing in their
rear, General Walker received permission to begin his offensive operations
on D plus 1 day.
Elements of the 1st Marine Division arrived in Kobe, Japan throughout
29 August to 3 September. The process of reconfiguring the load of the assault
transports began immediately. Working on a tight schedule, it was
interrupted for one day due to a typhoon passing through Japan. Only the
assault elements were combat loaded because of the light sea and air
opposition that was expected from the North Koreans. The 7th Division
would be administratively loaded.
Another typhoon was detected forming to the south; it was anticipated
that it would interfere with the transit of TG 90.1, TG 90.2, and TG 90.3. Some
elements of the ATF had departed, and Admiral Doyle decided to accelerate
the sortie plan on D minus 4 days to allow the remaining elements of the
ATF to avoid the typhoon.
As the assault forces were embarking onboard transports, prelanding
operations began in the vicinity of Inchon. Wolmi-do was attacked by Marine
aircraft from the CVEs dropping napalm on D minus 5 days. Upon
completion of the mission, they transited to Sasebo to replenish, in order to
arrive back in the vicinity of Inchon to support additional pre-assault
preparations and the attack on D-Day. To divert attention away from Inchon,
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on the same day the British light carrier HMS Triumph conducted a
diversionary raid in the vicinity of Kunson. The fast carriers from TF 77
conducted further strikes on both Inchon and Wolmi-do on D minus 3 days
and D minus 2 days.
The destroyers of TG 90.6 proceeded up the channel to bombard Wolmi-
do on D minus 2 days. While in the channel, they came across some mines,
which they detected in time to destroy with gunfire. During the
bombardment, the ships took position 500 yards from the island. As a result,
two of the ships suffered some casualties and minor damage from the enemy
shore. Upon completion of the mission, they moved back down the channel,
destroying eight more mines. The following day, they repeated the mission,
encountering no more mines.
Early on D-Day, TG 90.1 started up the channel to land TG 92.12 at GREEN
Beach. The first wave hit the beach at 0633 hours, after air and naval gunfire
had provided more than thirty minutes of suppression fire. Resistance was
light, and by 1030 hours the island was under control. Encouraged by the ease
of capture of the island, the commander of BLT 3/5 requested permission to
send a reconnaissance in force of tanks and infantry across the causeway into
the city. Headquarters denied the request, believing it would entail too much
risk. The battalion remained on the island and prepared to support the main
landing that evening. (Montros and Canzona, 1955, pp. 87-94)
The main landing was again preceded by extensive air and naval fires to
suppress enemy activity. The first wave landing at RED Beach successfully
got over the seawall; on the right they advanced into the city and began to
move on the initial objectives, on the left they suffered some casualties and
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the advance was held up by an enemy strongpoint. Units from the center
were able to outflank and destroy the enemy strongpoint, allowing the
advance inland to begin along the entire front. At this point, the fourth and
fifth waves became intermixed in the boat lane. When they landed they were
disorganized; it took some time reorganize those units and get a coherent
advance going. (Montross and Canzona, 1955, pp. 105-110) By 0001 hours a
rough perimeter had been established covering the assault force objectives.
The eight LSTs had landed on RED Beach with little problem and were in the
process of being off-loaded.
The landing on BLUE Beach was also disorganized. The area was covered
by smoke from burning buildings on the shore, which made navigation by
the LVTs in the boat lane difficult. Colonel Lewis B. Puller, RCT 1
Commander, landed in the fourth wave, and began to organize the forces on
the beach. There was one narrow exit from the beach, but resistance was light.
After the initial confusion, progress was made before the advance was halted
for the night. (Montross and Canzona, 1955, pp. 115-122) After the assault
waves and their immediate logistical needs were landed, BLUE Beach was
dosed, and supply points were established at RED Beach and GREEN Beach to
continue the buildup of combat power into the beachhead.
On D plus 1 day, RCT 1 and RCT 5 linked up and continued the advance
to the FBHL, which they reached by 1700 hours. The command post for the
1st Marine Division was established ashore, and the Commanding General
assumed responsibility for operations ashore at 1800 hours, ending the
amphibious assault phase of Operation Chromite.
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The next day (D plus 2 days) began the next phase of the operation, the
exploitation of the landing. RCT 5 began its advance to Kimpo Airfield; it
reached the airfield that evening and was able to occupy half of the airfield.
The North Koreans counterattacked that night, but the attacks were weak and
disjointed resulting in no effect. RCT 1 continued an advance to the east
along the Inchon-Seoul road, encountering enemy resistance along the route.
Kimpo Airfield was cleared of enemy troops on the morning of D plus 3
days, and was ready for operation by fighter aircraft by D plus 5 days. RCT 5
next prepared to cross the Han River, after clearing the south bank of the
river of all enemy forces in its sector. The crossing took place on D plus 5
days; by D plus 6 days the entire regiment was operating on the north bank of
the Han River.
Joint Task Force 7 was dissolved on D plus 6 days, when control of the
land campaign passed from Admiral Struble to General Almond,
Commanding General of X Corps. The naval forces were redesignated the
Support Force, and remained in the area until 1 October, under the command
of Admiral Struble. (Fields, 1962, p. 217)
The 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division landed at
Inchon on 18 September; it moved to the front lines and took a position on
the right flank of the 1st Marines, which was accomplished by 1800 hours on
19 September. RCT 1 continued to advance toward Yongdungpo. The North
Koreans had decided to commit a substantial number of troops to its defense,
hoping to forestall the capture of Seoul. In two days of hard fighting the
Marines succeeded in capturing the town and arrived on the banks of the Han
river opposite Seoul.
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The 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division landed in Inchon
on 19 September and was deployed on the right flank of the 32nd Infantry
Regiment. The last major ground force to enter the objective area was RCT 7,
which had been organizing for combat in Japan, combining a battalion from
the Mediterranean with reserves and other troops from the United States.
They embarked in Kobe on 17 September and arrived in Inchon on 22
September. The 7th Marines deployed across the Han River, to pass in the
rear of the 5th Marines and to operate to the northeast of Seoul.
On 22 September, the town of Suwon, and the airfield in its vicinity, was
captured by the 31st Regiment. The airfield was immediately put into use by
United Nations aircraft. (Appleman, 1961, p. 522) To the north, the 32nd
Regiment was advancing to the southeast of Seoul, capturing key terrain
controlling the roads into the city from the south. By 24 September the 32nd
Regiment was on the south bank of the Han River. (Appleman, 1961, p. 523)
To the northwest of Seoul, the 5th Marines met resistance from a brigade
and a regiment of enemy troops established in defensive positions dug into
the heights. An attempt to capture the hills and defeat the enemy force failed
in a series of attacks on 22 September and 23 September. On 24 September the
attack was preceded by air strikes, of which five of ten planes were damaged by
North Korean antiaircraft fire. This attack succeeded, and the outer defenses
of Seoul fell, leaving the way open for an attack into the city.
General Smith, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, and
General Almond, commanding general of X Corps, disagreed on the
disposition of forces for the attack into Seoul. Smith wanted to unite the
Division on the north side of the Han River. His preferred plan was to cross
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the 1st Marines over the river, advance them along the north bank of the
river, then have them change direction and attack through the center of the
city. Almond was concerned that the frontal assaults of the Marines would
take too much time, and preferred to have the 1st Marines maneuver from
their position in Yongdungpo along the south bank of the Han River, then
cross the river and attack into Seoul. On 23 September, Almond told Smith
that he could cross the 1st Marines over the river before attacking into Seoul,
but that the division boundaries would be shifted to allow the 32nd Regiment
and the 17th Regiment to envelop the city from the south. (Appleman, 1962,
p. 527)
On 25 September, as the Marines were entering Seoul, the two regiments
from the 7th Infantry Division crossed the Han River. Against light enemy
defenses, they cleared the north bank of the river. Based on reports of
columns of enemy forces leaving the city to the northeast received at dusk on
25 September, General Almond mistakenly believed that the North Koreans
were abandoning the city. He ordered immediate attack into the city. The
enemy in front of the 1st Marine Division launched a counterattack to cover
the withdrawal of other North Korean forces. The enemy counterattack
delayed the general advance into the center of the city. The following day, the
attack by the Marines resumed and gained little ground. The North Koreans
had built barricades defended by soldiers with antitank weapons and machine
guns. On 27 September, the street fighting continued, but the center of the
city had been captured and enemy resistance had been broken. (Appleman,
1961, pp. 529-536)
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The last stages of Operation Chromite began on 27 September, when the
31st Regiment linked with units of the 1st Cavalry Division at Osan. The
formal ceremony of returning Seoul to the South Korean government was
held on 29 September. By 7 October, all of the X Corps forces had been
relieved by units of the Eighth Army, ending Operation Chromite. The
gunfire support ships had been released on 4 October, when there were no
longer any targets within gunnery range, and TF 77 had withdrawn from the
area on 3 October. The Fifth Air Force had relieved Tactical Air Command X
on 5 October. (Field, 1962, pp. 216-218)
F. ANALYSIS
In many respects, it is difficult to conduct a conclusive analysis of the
Korean campaign. The military aspects of the campaign are straightforward;
the campaign, and especially Operation Chromite, was an example of the
flexibility that can be put into effect when a naval power fights with high
quality, technologically superior forces on an accessible peninsula. However,
a similar generalization is impossible when those military operations are
placed into the larger political context; both the military and political
leadership was uncertain of the overall objective of the campaign, and of the
war.
The commitment of ground forces into Korea, in addition to the
previously committed naval and air forces, led to the possibility for joint
operations subordinate to the unified theater commander. It was the
operational perspective of the theater commander, General MacArthur, who
ensured that these joint forces would be used in a dramatic and effective
manner.
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As in the previous two case studies, it was the common sense and
capabilities of professional military officers, in the context of a specific
situation, that overcame the obstacles preventing the planning and execution
of a model joint operation. The experience of these men in World War Two,
and not efforts to achieve "efficiencies" through service unification or the
official establishment of a joint staff, was the source of joint operational
competency during Operation Chromite. This is not meant to imply that
inter-service rivalry was absent, but only that it was not insurmountable.
This operational competency was squandered due to the inability to articulate
a strategic objective for the war.
The objective of a campaign in a maritime theater is derived from
conditions within that theater, which are derived from the larger strategic
interests of the nation. If the Korean War is viewed within the larger context
of the Cold War, then the interrelationship of a maritime theater to a primary
theater holds. That primary theater was Western Europe, but the indirect
effect of events between the theaters is difficult to trace in a cold war. Thus,
part of the reason that a clear objective could not be articulated was the
tendency to view Western Europe and Korea as either directly related,
through Soviet complicity, or not related, through geographical and cultural
distance. The ideal would have been to view each theater as an independent
entity, though related through the effects of U.S. policy.
A second reason that the U.S. could not articulate an objective for its
strategy in a limited war may have been a lack of experience, other than for a
brief period during the Spanish-American War. Since the Seventeenth
Century, European powers conducted military campaigns in maritime
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theaters to achieve limited objectives that would translate into increased
economic power, destruction of an enemy's economic base, or for bargaining
leverage in post-war peace negotiations. The U.S. has normally conducted
campaigns in a maritime theater for a military purpose, and not as a part of a
comprehensive strategic design. When confronted by the complexities of a
limited war in a location that did not have a linear military-strategic
relationship, U.S. leadership became frustrated.
In the summer of 1950, these uncertainties over the ultimate objective of
the war provided MacArthur with the freedom to develop a plan that not
only had an objective of recovering the territory of South Korea, but also of
destroying the North Korean army fighting in South Korea. By attacking
from the sea in a bold envelopment, MacArthur hoped to seize the initiative
from the North Koreans. Once that concept was formed in his mind, the
process of planning an amphibious operation began, utilizing a proven
amphibious warfare doctrine. From this doctrine, an operation was
systematically organized. At both the theater level and the joint task force
level, forces were organized in a decentralized manner. The effect of this was
to divide responsibilities based on the capabilities of available forces.
During the execution of the plan, most combat occurred on the ground
due to the absence of effective enemy opposition at sea and in the air. In
some respects, the overwhelming supporting fires that were available
reduced tactics to a reliance on attrition and methodical advance, rather than
on maneuver and surprise. This possibly had the effect of prolonging the
operation, as it gave the enemy the time and opportunity to concentrate their
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forces while on the defensive. A campaign of maneuver may have kept the
enemy off balance and led to a quicker victory.
In planning Operation Chromite, MacArthur correctly gauged the
enemy's weaknesses, primarily the imbalance between the large number of
North Koreans fighting in the south and the small number remaining to
guard communications in the rest of the peninsula. MacArthur saw the
campaign both as a comprehensive entity and as a number of constituent
parts. This enabled him to envision a series of military operations divided
both by distance and by time.
Such a sophisticated campaign, in the particular circumstances of Korea,
not only required joint forces, but also that they be decentralized. MacArthur
balanced the forces available between the Eighth Army and JTF 7, and the
supporting forces for both, which resulted in a suitable use of the unified
forces in the theater. This left his subordinate commanders with sufficient
latitude to execute their portion of the overall plan, and gave the entire
operation a degree of flexibility.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has approached the topic of planning from the point of view
that joint operations in a maritime theater create specific problems for the
conduct of military operations. To analyze those problems, two related
concepts were introduced. First, the operational perspective to provide the
link between strategic objectives and combat. Second, the existence of a
dynamic relationship between planning and combat.
A maritime theater is a tool for the political and military leadership of a
nation used to allocate resources, among them military forces, and which
contains national strategic objectives. For the military planner viewing a
maritime theater from the operational perspective, a prominent characteristic
is that lines of communication that are of strategic interest or are required to
support military operations lay primarily over water. Implicit to this
characteristic is that the maritime theater will be located at a distance from the
major source of national (or alliance) military power or of the greatest threat
to the nation (or alliance). Thus, a maritime theater will usually have a
secondary importance to some other theater. This concept was demonstrated
by each of the case studies. For Great Britain in 1915, the primary theater was
in Western Europe, or for the Entente as a whole, it was in Eastern Europe.
For both Germany in 1940 and the United States in 1950, the primary theater
was also in Western Europe. Nonetheless, each nation conducted military
operations in a maritime theater.
A corollary to this relationship between theaters of operations is that the
success or failure of a nation to attain its strategic objectives in one theater is
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indirectly related to the success or failure in another. The failure of Great
Britain in Turkey did not result in a failure in Western Europe. Nor did the
success of Germany in Norway lead directly to its success in France and the
Low Countries later that year.
The combination of water and distance leads to further conclusions
concerning the nature of military operations in a maritime theater. First,
there is the problem of mobility, both beyond the boundaries of the nation to
the theater and also within the theater. This was solved by each nation
through a combination of methods. Great Britain in 1915, as a sea power,
utilized its control of the sea to move its forces. Germany in 1940, without
the benefit of overwhelming sea power, combined movement over the sea
and through the air. Germany attained control of the sea for a limited period
of time through the innovative use of combatants to quickly move assault
forces by sea. A considerable amount of air transport was also used to provide
a prompt build-up of combat power in the theater. The United States in 1950
also used a combination of sea and air transport to move military forces into
the theater, though with the benefit of sea and air control. This combination
of different means to move military forces is one source of joint operations in
a maritime theater.
A second source of joint operations in a maritime theater arises when
there is a desire to obtain a decisive objective in a maritime theater. This
requires the use of ground forces. To provide combat support to the ground
forces to allow a measure of freedom to maneuver requires a combination of
sea and air forces to gain superiority in those elements. This naturally leads
to a joint operation.
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The combined use of ground, sea, and air forces, in some sort of
preplanned arrangement against an enemy force, to attain a strategic,
objective leads to combat. It is on this relationship between preplanned
actions and combat, within the context of joint operations in a maritime
theater, that this analysis will now focus.
A plan foresees combat, or a series of combats, each which contributes to
the attainment of the objective. Two aspects of combat breeds a condition of
uncertainty. First is the existence of friction, illustrated in the Gallipoli case
study by the unintended landing of the first assault wave at ANZAC Beach
one mile north of the intended beach center. Second is the opposing will of
the enemy, illustrated in the same case study by the unexpected tenacity of the
Turkish defenders.
Despite this uncertainty, success in combat is the key element in the
planning/execution relationship. Toward this end, a plan must bring forces
into combat with the enemy under favorable conditions, to achieve some
combination of surprise, initiative, and concentration of available forces
relative to the enemy. This requires the cooperation among the forces
available. Additionally, the uncertain nature of combat creates a dynamic
situation that may invalidate a considerable portion of the original course of
action. It follows that a plan can contribute to success in combat in two ways:
(1) by coordinating the actions of the available forces, and (2) by
communicating the intent of the operation.
The characteristics of a maritime theater create problems for coordination
of joint forces. The planning to coordinate the actions of available forces is
derived from the intent of the operation, and assisted by a systematic
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planning process and the promulgation of a written plan. The written plan
can be in any one of a number of formats: a five paragraph operation order, a
letter of instruction, or a pre-formatted naval message. A systematic planning
process makes the mass of details, required in an operations plan, more
manageable. The complexity of the actual plans for the three campaigns
analyzed was only alluded to in this study. For example, the reconfiguration
of the 29th Division prior to the Gallipoli landing, the logistic detail required
to support Group XXI in Norway, and the reembarkation of the 1st Marine
Division within hours of most of the division arriving in the Far East
Theater, all represent an extensive planning effort.
Separate from details of planning procedures, the case studies have
stressed the conceptual aspect of planning, which requires an understanding
of the problems of coordination. As was demonstrated in each case study,
coordination among joint forces can be accomplished through the
organization of means, space, and time. Coordination of means in each case
was accomplished through decentralization by forming interdependent task
groups assigned specific missions. Coordination of space was accomplished in
two ways. First, through the division of the theater into smaller operating
areas and the assignment of a specific unit to those areas. Second, through
the designation of objectives ashore, to serve as points of reference.
Coordination of time was accomplished through either sequential or
concurrent operations, which was dependent upon the situation.
The promulgation of procedures is a further method of coordination that
can be accomplished through the plan. This was not stressed in the case
studies, but one can see the value of prearranged communications procedures
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and networks, execution checklists to allow a headquarters to passively
monitor the progress of operations, and schedules for resupply of combatant
forces. Many of these procedures are part of service doctrinal preferences,
such as procedures for close air support, and have the potential to result in
confusion in a joint operation if not clearly delineated prior to operations.
The result of this coordination through a plan is to bring the
commander's forces into advantageous position for combat, and also to
provide the framework for the ongoing cooperation of forces throughout the
course of the operation. There is a need for sufficient detail in the plan to
accomplish the coordination required, yet success in combat, and not the
sophistication of the plan, will determine the ultimate success or failure of
the campaign. To provide for success in combat, partially through maneuver
beyond initial combat and through initiative of subordinates, requires a
flexible plan.
The most important purpose of a plan is to communicate the intent of
the operation. Subordinates engaged in combat, if aware of the commander's
intentions, will use that information to guide their actions. Parallel with the
initiative of subordinates, the commander utilizes subsequent plans, which
build on the initial plan, to shape combat to achieve the desired effect.
Through the selective monitoring of combat at decisive points, the
commander can obtain the information necessary to alter the original plan.
When taking all of these influences and interrelationships into account, we
see the need for maintenance of an operational perspective, focused on the
objective of the campaign-
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